A Comparative Approach to Euroscepticism in Turkey and Eastern European Countries

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Online Publication Date: 01 August 2008
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ABSTRACT The pre-accession strategy, by challenging national sovereignty, erodes motivations for EU membership in the candidate countries, hence arising nationalistic reactions. Euroscepticism manifests itself in various forms depending on the way the country undergoes the transition, the domestic meaning of the accession and the country-specific patterns of euroscepticism. The Central and Eastern European countries mostly display great motivations for accession. The gap between expectations and the EU’s functioning feed public euroscepticism. Mainstream party consensus however, often filters euroscepticism. Turkey distinguishes by an overall mistrust at both public and party level. The EU’s reform demands and the European reluctance for Turkish accession have generated mistrust, focusing the ‘EU debate’ on the cost of accession. At public level, mistrust has fed the idea of an ‘EU threat’ around which the different spheres of the society have come together to oppose EU membership. At party level, mistrust caused parties from fully embracing the EU prospective, which the 2002 elections exemplify. The Turkish case thus illustrates how the uncertainty of the accession affects public opinion and party positioning on the EU issue.

KEY WORDS: public euroscepticism, party based euroscepticism, Turkey, Eastern European Countries, nationalism

Introduction

The accession process is likely to generate Euroscepticism in candidate countries, revolving around questions of national sovereignty. The level of support for the EU can be expected to be eroded, despite strong motivation among some candidate states for membership. The contrast between motivation and eroding support holds true, particularly, for the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) and the current candidates.

Euroscepticism in candidate countries is worth exploring since the issues of legitimacy, social acceptability and people’s satisfaction concerning EU functioning are becoming more important and challenging as the number of member states increases. Euroscepticism in the context of candidate countries turns out to be an important problem, since it affects policy-making at both the national and EU levels after accession. Eurosceptic reactions...
vary with country-specific conditions. However, some convergence can be identified amongst countries displaying similar political and social set-ups.

This article aims to identify patterns of Euroscepticism in the CEEC and Turkey. The choice of the CEEC and Turkey lies in the similarities between the meanings of accession in the national contexts and the pre-accession strategies that apply. These countries also converge in their displays of nationalist reactions to the EU. Despite these similarities, Turkey is distinguished by an overall public mistrust and sovereignist reactionary movements under which both members of civil society and the left and right wing parties cooperate in opposing the threat EU accession poses to national and territorial integrity. This research aims to understand how Turkish Euroscepticism differs from other forms and what underlies this atypical reaction. It is hypothesised that the particularity of the Turkish context draws on opposition to Turkish accession in Europe and the uncertainty of this accession.

These two factors, building on the meaning of accession and the dynamics of inter-party competition, have generated a general public mistrust and Eurosceptic inter-party cooperation which cuts across the left–right dimensions. This hypothesis will be tested at the public and party levels through a comparative approach. The first part focuses on the patterns of Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe. The aim is to discover the extent to which the accession process engenders similar impacts in countries with similar backgrounds. The second part will elaborate Turkish Euroscepticism in comparison with the CEEC. This will help identify the dynamics that have generated atypicality in Turkey.

The context of the CEEC

Public Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe

The ‘meaning’ of accession affects expectations for membership and the degree of opposition. For Milner the meaning of membership is shaped by historical and cultural factors, as well as by the way in which EU membership is introduced to the public. She suggested that amongst the EU 15 those countries that saw EU accession as a solution to domestic problems showed lower levels of Euroscepticism (Greece, Portugal, Ireland) than did those who were less dependent on the EU (Finland, Denmark, Sweden). Shaping the expectations of membership has followed the same process in the CEEC.

In contrast to Western Europe, where party systems and liberal markets preceded European integration, Eastern Europeans had been expecting that EU membership would help in the transition to a liberal economy and democracy. EU membership also echoed the affirmation of their European identity and security vis-à-vis Russia. Consequently, accession was perceived as a solution to many domestic problems. People have idealised the EU and judged integration more on their expectations and ideals than on a cost–benefit analysis. The gap between people’s expectations and the EU’s actual performance stimulates Euroscepticism. The Maltese and the Cypriots differ in that they have not idealised the EU. Public opinion is rather shaped by the extent to which their expectations of membership have been realised.

Eurobarometer results emphasise the importance of expectations. In 2005 ‘political crises led Eastern Europeans to believe that democracy worked better in the EU than in their country’. Fifty-nine per cent of new members believed that EU membership would help in the transition to a liberal economy and democracy. EU membership also echoed the affirmation of their European identity and security vis-à-vis Russia. Consequently, accession was perceived as a solution to many domestic problems. People have idealised the EU and judged integration more on their expectations and ideals than on a cost–benefit analysis. The gap between people’s expectations and the EU’s actual performance stimulates Euroscepticism. The Maltese and the Cypriots differ in that they have not idealised the EU. Public opinion is rather shaped by the extent to which their expectations of membership have been realised.

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This result did not change in 2006, despite a general trend of increasing public support across the EU. Satisfaction with membership was 37% for the Maltese, versus 62% for the new members as a whole and 33% for the EU 25. New members had a better view of the EU than did old members (53 versus 49%). However, accession countries were less satisfied by the standard of living than old members (70 versus 83%, 69 versus 82% in the autumn surveys).

Despite strong public and elite motivation for accession, the Eurobarometer results in 2004 indicated pessimism in the accession countries. In 2004 the new members expected a worsening of their economic situation. The level of trust in EU institutions decreased by 15% from 2003. The average level of support was 43%, versus 48% in the old members. The level of opposition was 16%, but rising. These results are interesting in the sense that for the first time in the history of European integration newcomer countries showed weaker support than the established members.

That is partly due to the accession negotiations which, by their nature, increase Euroscepticism. After Austria joined the EU the already weak public support for membership decreased further. Also, the ‘grand coalition’ (SPÖ-ÖVP) lost much of its share of the vote because of the unpopular outcomes of some harmonisation projects, such as road transit and real estate. Likewise, the transition created policy losers in the CEEC. Furthermore, the pre-accession strategy set up a hierarchical relationship between the EU and each candidate country. Amongst its many mechanisms, conditionality in particular gave the public the impression that national governments were directed by an ‘EU dictatorship’. Thus, accession negotiations would seem to erode the motivation to ‘return to Europe’. In fact, ‘the countries furthest from accession, such as Bulgaria and Romania, showed greater support than the first wave countries, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and the Baltic Republics’.

Public Euroscepticism does not necessarily translate into party-based Euroscepticism. That is because, besides channelling, political parties shape and filter public opinion. Therefore, party-based Euroscepticism will be considered in the next part.

**Party-based ‘Euroscepticism’**

Party-based Euroscepticism has been divided into hard and soft Euroscepticism by Taggart and Szczerbiak. The authors defined hard Euroscepticism as ‘principled opposition to the project of European integration’ (based on transfer of powers); soft euroscepticism is ‘when there is not a principled objection to the European integration project, but there is opposition to the EU’s current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make’. This definition lies in the rhetoric used by the actors. This article will adopt Taggart and Szczerbiak’s definition. It better describes Euroscepticism in candidate countries where parties do not express a clear position on specific EU policies or on the future of the EU.

Patterns of party-based Euroscepticism depend on the structure of the party system and on the way the membership has added to the national context. European integration has not created a new cleavage; it is an addition to already existing issues. Whereas some issues have generated transnational divisions—such as economic integration—some have reinforced national divisions, for instance welfare systems. As such, the ‘EU issue’ has transformed party competition by constraining governments’ ‘policy repertoire’, causing shifts in party positions and allowing peripheral parties to use Euroscepticism as a means of differentiation.
As the EU gains importance in domestic politics parties may adopt ‘opportunistic strategies either in a pro- or anti-EU position’. Consequently, divisions on the subject of the EU may stimulate the formation of ‘unusual coalitions’ and shifts in party positions.

Furthermore, integration limits national governments’ ‘policy repertoire’ and affects centre–periphery party relations. Transfer of competencies takes many policy instruments away from governments. This restriction enables peripheral parties to use ‘sovereignist’ discourses against governments and to play on the votes of policy losers. However, hard Eurosceptic parties moderate their opposition in government.

Having delineated the theses of the impact of EU integration on party politics, let us see whether the CEEC display such patterns.

Party-based Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe

Unlike Western Europe, liberal democracy is new to Eastern Europe. During the transition the CEEC party system has imitated the Western party system. However, due to the impact of their communist past and the newness of democratic competition, party competition is still less structured and party positions are less coherent along the left–right dimension.

The EU has been a crucial component of the transition process. EU integration has added to the existing issues in a way which depends on ‘domestic factors and national political relations’. Therefore, patterns of Euroscepticism depend on the way in which democratic transition has taken place within domestic institutions.

As mentioned earlier, the pre-accession strategy has generated Euroscepticism. By using mechanisms like conditionality, timing and benchmarking, the EU’s policy demands have constrained national governments in their ‘policy repertoire’, as does the transfer of sovereignty in member states. Hence, the pre-accession mechanisms have pressured governments in terms of their performance vis-à-vis other applicants and domestic rivals. Governments especially have been attacked by peripheral parties, whose Euroscepticism cost them little.

The liberal nature of the Copenhagen criteria set ‘pro-market/libertarian’ parties against ‘anti-market/authoritarian’ ones. On the other hand, as a reaction to communist

Table 1. Votes for Eurosceptic parties 2000–2003 and the shift towards electoral Euroscepticism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>Combined shift</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>(—, 7.30)</td>
<td>18.07, 18.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+29.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>(11.00, 31.60)</td>
<td>18.5, 25.5</td>
<td>7.2, 41.9</td>
<td>0.55, 28.4</td>
<td>+2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>(9.60, 42.00)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>(2.43, 30.68)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.2, 41.9</td>
<td>0.55, 28.4</td>
<td>-4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>(—, 27.10)</td>
<td>—, 9.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-7.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>(—, 36.10)</td>
<td>—, 26.95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-9.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>—, 6.94</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>0.59, 4.38</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The identification of Eurosceptic parties is derived from the expert opinions reported in Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002, pp. 29–30). The proportion of votes for hard Eurosceptic parties is given first, followed by that for the soft Eurosceptic parties. The results of elections prior to 2000 are given in parentheses in the 2000 column. Combined shift shows the increase or decrease in the vote for all Eurosceptic parties over the last two elections. No elections have been held in Lithuania or Slovenia since 2000 so no shift is shown for these countries.
conservatism, the right has a tendency to support liberal economics, individual rights and freedoms, whereas the left argues for collectivism, egalitarianism and authoritarianism. Therefore, EU integration generates broad divisions. Eurosceptic parties appear on both sides of the spectrum. The nature of Eurosceptic reactions depends on domestic factors within a given country. Because of the newness of the membership experience most CEEC parties have not formulated a clear stance on EU policies.

Let us now compare election results before and after accession to understand the influence of Euroscepticism on CEEC party politics. According to Table 1 Eurosceptic parties exist in almost all party systems, except Bulgaria which displays neither hard nor soft Euroscepticism, and on both the left and right. Hard Eurosceptic parties are generally peripheral to their systems, whereas some mainstream parties display soft Euroscepticism, such as the Slovak MDS, the Hungarian FIDESZ or the Czech Civic Democratic Party.

Eurosceptic parties had a low share of the vote before accession, the average being 4.2% for hard Eurosceptic parties and 21.7% for soft Eurosceptic ones. Their share of the vote has only increased in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The Hungarian FIDESZ gained votes, while the Czech Civic Democratic Party did not. The Polish party Self-Defence and the League of Polish Families increased its share by 29%. Lewis thought this due to domestic factors such as fragmentation of the party system, voter volatility and the rather low salience of EU issues in voter preferences. Given the fact that mainstream parties usually agree on EU integration and the existing mainstream Eurosceptic parties follow a soft line, it can be inferred that hard Euroscepticism was and has remained less influential than soft Euroscepticism. Besides, the high level of public Euroscepticism, as measured by Eurobarometer, does not result in a high level of support for Eurosceptic parties. Indeed, in Estonia, despite a high level of public Euroscepticism, the Eurosceptic Independence Party won just 0.55% of the vote.

Briefly, Euroscepticism has become a component of party politics, but it is in decline across the CEEC. Domestic party systems filter out a high level of public Euroscepticism due to the pro-EU consensus amongst mainstream parties, with the exception of some soft eurosceptic mainstream parties in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. It is usually peripheral parties that take up Euroscepticism. The exceptions prove the fact that qualitative and quantitative patterns of Euroscepticism depend on the way EU integration has made an addition to domestic structures and issues.

**Euroscepticism In Turkey**

**Public Euroscepticism in Turkey**

Turks display both a high level of support for EU accession (44%, the lowest among the candidates) and a rising level of Euroscepticism (15% in autumn 2005, 25% in 2006). The particularity of Turkish Euroscepticism lies in the overall growing mistrust of the EU. The Eurobarometer survey of 2006 showed that the Turkish people seek accession in order to increase economic prosperity (35%), cohesion (21%) and the likelihood of peace (23%). In the member states the main advantages of membership are free movement (50%) and the Euro (39%). Turkish people fear that EU membership will have an adverse impact on the national culture/identity and the Turkish Lira (both around 50%). It can be inferred that the Turkish mirror their dissatisfaction and worries about the future in their expectations of accession, as is the case in the CEEC.
Growing public Euroscepticism is due to an overall mistrust of the EU. European reluctance to include Turkey underlies this mistrust and the feeling that accession is uncertain. The emergence of a reactionary nationalist (Ulusalcılar) movement should be considered in this regard. This movement brings together people and organisations from various social and political backgrounds. It emphasises the notion of a ‘threat’ by the EU to national and territorial integrity. The Ulusalcılar differs from the Eurosceptic movements in Eastern Europe, which play on the ‘national sovereignty’ argument, by its heterogeneous profile and articulation of the immediacy of the threat of disintegration.

Let us now consider the meaning of EU accession to Turkey in relation to Turkish mistrust, so as to better understand the nature of the nationalist movement.

The Meaning of Accession to Turkey versus ‘Turkish Scepticism’ about Europe

The pre-accession mechanisms stimulated Euroscepticism in Turkey, as in the CEEC. However, Euroscepticism draws rather on European unwillingness to include Turkey, which contrasts with the meaning of EU accession in the Turkish context.

Many Europeans are reluctant to accept Turkish accession because of, among other things, Turkey’s poor human rights record, particularly with regard to ethnic minority rights, an underperforming economy, the large population, its proximity to problematic areas in the Middle East, its Muslim identity and cultural differences. Turkey is the only country whose accession has opened debates on ‘borders and identity’ and referenda on enlargement. Such discussions raise doubts about the probability of accession. Thus, the EU’s demands concerning conditionality generate mistrust. Most people believe that ‘no matter what Turkey does in terms of political or economic reforms, the EU will not let Turkey in’.

Turkey’s atypical run-up to candidacy has strengthened the feeling of mistrust. The Customs Union agreement established an asymmetrical relationship, in that Turkey had to comply with decisions but could not participate in the decision-making. While transforming the Turkish economy, the Customs Union has created policy losers. Thus its harmful effects—involving policy losers and a transfer of sovereignty—have been put forward as salient arguments by both hard and soft Eurosceptics. Turkey’s exclusion from the list of candidate countries in 1998 has strengthened the public impression that the EU was using ‘prospective accession’ to exploit Turkey through the Customs Union.

Concerning its psychological and political implications, the meaning of accession to Turkey recalls the motivation of ‘returning to Europe’ in the CEEC. In Turkey EU accession symbolises the finalisation of the Kemalist modernisation project. Started in the 1920s, the aim of this project is for Turkey to ‘reach the level of modern (western) civilisations’. Consequently, its modernisation, state and nation building processes have adopted the western model. Turkey usually sided with Europe in foreign policy, although the Kemalist revolution aimed to save the fatherland from invasion by the western Great Powers. Therefore, the West has been both a model and the historical enemy. In Turkey accession implies a reaffirmation of a European identity as was the case in the CEEC.

EU accession has become attractive given the need for political and economic liberalisation since the 1980s. Turgut Özal, prime minister at the time, believed that EU membership would make Turkey a regional power and improve its image, damaged by the coup d’état of 1980. As in the CEEC, EU accession appeared as a solution to domestic
problems. The importance of EU accession has grown in the post-Cold War era, since Turkey needs to place itself in a multipolar world. The European reluctance to include Turkey contrasts with the Kemalist idea of the ‘grandeur’ of the nation and produces a feeling of being undermined. Reactionary movements feed on this feeling, and public mistrust. Let us analyse the patterns of such reactionary movements through the case of the Ulusalılar.

**The Ulusalılar**

The ‘Ulusalılar’ is a reactionary ‘movement’ that calls for mobilisation to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EU’s reform demands and reluctance to allow Turkish accession have channelled Ulusalı reactionism into Euroscepticism. As some EU reforms have involved taboo areas—such as minorities, Cyprus, etc.—the Ulusalılar has seen harmonisation laws as giving in to the ‘enemy’.

The movement is based on no precise ideology. Rather, the use of a similar vocabulary helps identify the Ulusalılar. Despite some discursive similarities with Eurosceptics in Europe, the Ulusalılar is distinguished by an emphasis on the notion of ‘threat’. They play on the ‘Sèvres syndrome’, which involves ‘the perception of being encircled by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state’. In their thinking ‘the immediacy of the threat requires abandoning the left–right dispute’.

The notion of a threat by a common ‘enemy’ has gathered together people and institutions from different political and social backgrounds. In fact, the Ulusalılar did not emerge as an institution or a well-coordinated centralised movement. First, informal links and contacts were established and joint declarations were made: after an unexpected meeting in 2002, the famous leftist journalist İlhan Sılaçık (owner of Cumhuriyet, a left-wing republican newspaper) and Devlet Bahçeli (leader of the MHP nationalist party) issued a joint declaration in which they emphasised their agreement on every issue, especially on the necessity of reactivating the Kuvay-i Milliye spirit.

This meeting encouraged further rapprochement between the left and right: the famous artist and member of the CHP (the CHP holds a centre-left Kemalist viewpoint) Cem Karaca wrote a letter praising Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of the MHP. The ex-prosecutor of the Turkish Supreme Court, made a declaration to Milli Gazete—the unofficial newspaper of the Islamist Virtue Party (the FP) that he had closed down when in office—praising Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the RP. Further contacts were established between the nationalist MHP, the Maoist Workers Party (IP), the Democratic Left Party (DSP), the Republican Democrat Party (the CDP, led by Yekta Güngör Özden, ex-president of the Turkish Constitutional Court), the Fatherland Party (YP) and the nationalist Islamist Party of Independent Turkey (BTP). Many universities joined this camp, such as Ankara Gazi University, Istanbul University, Marmara University (Istanbul) and Malatya İnönü University. Many anti-EU and anti-US conferences were held in such universities, where hard Eurosceptic scholars, generals and politicians criticised Turkish foreign policy. Institutionalisation followed this stage. After a conference on ‘populism’ in September 2003, Kemal Alemdaroğlu, the rector of Istanbul University, launched the Kuvay-i Milliye movement. After this declaration several small organisations emerged, such as Yeniden Mıddafa-i Hükûk Cemiyeti (Association for the Defense of Rights Once More) and Yurtsever Cephe (Patriotic Front), which is linked to the Communist Party of Turkey.
Most such institutions have no links to the Alemdaroğlu camp. Despite the common perception of threat and similarities in their discourse, these organisations emphasised their ideological and political differences vis-à-vis the others. The Ulusalcı have not been as influential as expected. Yet, their presence and the debates that they initiated are socially and politically significant.

Since both EU supporters and opponents display a general scepticism about the EU, ‘criticism’ cannot be used as an independent variable. As the Ulusalcılar is not a single institutionalised movement, it is hard to distinguish its position from the scepticism of the general public. Thus, this analysis will take the notion of threat and its frequency in discourses as independent variables.

**Discourse Analysis**

Patterns of Ulusalcı discourses can be analysed through press articles by academics and journalists. Mistrust constitutes a general pattern in the Turkish media, even in the pro-EU press. Yet, it becomes systematic and chronic in the eurosceptic media.

Reviews of the press are insightful for two reasons. Firstly, according to Eurobarometer, Turks garner information about the EU largely from the media. Secondly, most of the press have affiliations with political parties or associations. Thus this press review partly reflects the attitudes of anti-EU parties.

The analysis aims to discover whether there is a correlation between any intensification of criticism and its timing. Articles published around ‘important dates’ (such as EU summits, publication of the Commission progress report and national programme, reform packages) have been examined. This helps to identify the extent to which conditionality and the asymmetric nature of the pre-accession strategy has provoked reactions and whether criticism is generalised or aimed at a certain policy.

The following press organisations were chosen for analysis: *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, *Yeni Asya*, *Türk Yurdu* and *Yeni Mesaj* for the right wing and *Evrensel*, *Kızıl Bayrak* and *Türk Solu* for the left wing. The output of the Ulusalcı press as to the ‘important dates’ - from 2002 to 2005 – will be looked at first.

As Table 2 shows, the Kurdish problem, double standards and Cyprus are recurrent issues. Their high salience is due to the fact that they touch on national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The rise in the degree of criticism does not depend on the timing. Rather, an intensification of criticism is issue related: the Cyprus problem and the Kurdish and Armenian issues stimulate criticism at every occasion. This shows the reactionary nature of the Ulusalcılar. Moreover, although the government prepared seven reform packages, only some provoked criticism, such as the sixth reform package, which involved the Kurdish issue and the rights of religious minorities. It can be inferred that conditionality provokes nationalist reactions as it touches on issues related to national and territorial integrity.

Looking at the vocabulary, the notion of threat and the EU’s double standards are the most mentioned criticisms. Yet, there is a difference between the left-wing and right-wing press. The right-wing media constantly harp back to three historical references: the Sèvres Treaty, the spirit of ‘Kuvay-i Milliye’ and the war of independence, and quotes from Mustafa Kemal’s (especially his address to the nation). Following this thinking, the
Ulusalcilar interprets EU policies on Turkey as the continuum of an ‘ever-existing conspiracy plan’ of the West. They blame EU supporters for betraying the country.

People are sensitive to these issues for two reasons. The republican regime has inculcated in them the sacred values of the republic, such as territorial integrity. The rise of Kurdish terrorism and political Islamism, as well as the increasing salience of the Cyprus and Armenian issues since the 1980s, have also further sensitised the Turkish population. Indeed, the problem of terrorism by the Kurdish PKK is the most important problem after inflation, unemployment and corruption. Therefore, for most people EU demands concerning and criticisms of the above mentioned issues convey the idea of double standards and conspiracy.

Consequently, conditionality has provoked nationalism in Turkey, as in other candidate countries. However, in the particular context of Turkey European reluctance regarding Turkish accession has created an overall public mistrust and provoked nationalist reactionism which emphasises the danger of disintegration.

**Party-based Euroscepticism in Turkey**

In the 1990s EU accession was mainly perceived as a foreign policy issue. Therefore, political parties took sides regardless of their left–right position. However, as EU demands under conditionality touched on ‘sensitive issues’ and Turkish scepticism increased the ‘EU debate’ shifted from a foreign policy to a ‘national sovereignty versus liberalisation axis’. Peripheral parties used a pro-/anti-EU position as leverage in elections. The ANAP–MHP–DSP coalition and the 2002 parliamentary elections best illustrate this shift. This coalition was ousted from power in 2002 by the electoral victory of a new party, the AKP. The AKP is not included in the analysis because the focus is on the political scene prior to the 2002 elections.

**A Coalition Government Facing Conditionality**

To understand party positioning in the elections we need to consider the ANAP–MHP–DSP coalition. This coalition comprised the centre-right pro-EU ANAP, the centre-right nationalist MHP and the pro-EU centre-left DSP. The new government’s capacity was challenged by the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, where the EU was to take the decision on whether to give a date for the opening of negotiations in 2005. Thus the coalition was constrained by conditionality and timing prior to the parliamentary elections. The conflicting standpoints of these parties resulted in coordination problems concerning the EU’s reform demands. Reform concerning ‘sensitive issues’ constrained the coalition partners and other parties on the ground vis-à-vis the electorate.

Eurosceptic parties, including the MHP within the coalition, questioned conditionality. They argued that despite its reluctance to enlarge to include Turkey the EU used the prospect of accession to continue to exploit Turkey. For them conditionality disguised this aim and tested to the limit Turkey’s giving of concessions. Pro-EU parties, including the ANAP within the coalition, argued that these reforms were aimed at promoting democratisation and were not enacted to satisfy the EU. Consequently, parties aligned along the ‘national sovereignty/liberalisation axis’. The main theme of the ‘EU debate’ was the ‘cost of accession’. The reform of the death penalty and the use of the Kurdish language illustrate the debate.
The capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the head of the PKK, in 1999 set the people’s sensitivity to the Kurdish problem against their desire to join the EU. In Istanbul 74.8% of the people were against ruling out the death penalty for Öcalan, although 60% desired membership. EU pressure for the abolition of the death penalty increased nationalism and Euroscepticism. The law on use of the Kurdish language caused similar reactions. Indeed, the package which contained this reform was adopted under conditionality and increased Euroscepticism, as shown in the Table 2.

Such sensitive issues placed the MHP in opposition to the ANAP. The reforms were adopted thanks to DSP mediation. The MHP, in particular, was under pressure because nationalism underlay its electoral success and MHP voters objected to these reforms. Also, its responsibility within government required consent between the coalition partners. In line with the thesis on Eurosceptic parties in government, the MHP moderated its Euroscepticism. The party lost some of its credibility vis-à-vis its electorate. The ANAP used its pro-EU stance to gain votes in the elections.

**Party Positioning in the 2002 Elections**

The 2002 parliamentary election was difficult for parties because of time constraints (the Copenhagen Summit of December 2002) and the impact of the 2001 economic crisis. Besides, both pro-EU and anti-EU parties were challenged by the contrast between a strong public desire for accession and EU reluctance about Turkish accession. Public mistrust fuelled party-based Euroscepticism. It prevented pro-EU parties from fully supporting the EU. Thus a certain degree of soft Euroscepticism marked all mainstream parties. Also, it encouraged peripheral parties to embrace hard Euroscepticism, so as to attract policy losers’ votes.

Given the strong public support for accession, Eurosceptic mainstream parties could not declare clear opposition to membership. Rather, their opposition remained policy oriented, and hence softly Eurosceptic. Peripheral parties used a pro-EU/anti-EU stance as an electoral strategy. Therefore, parties aligned along the national sovereignty and liberalisation axis.

In categorising political parties party manifestos will be analysed following Taggart and Szczepanik’s scheme based on ‘self declaration’. The following scheme is proposed to classify the above mentioned political parties. All the political parties are not considered here for reasons of space. The independent variables for this classification are the notion of threat and Taggart and Szczepanik’s ‘principled opposition’. The reason for combining the two is the fact that the ‘national sovereignty’ argument does not suffice to separate hard and soft Euroscepticism in Turkey because of an overall public mistrust. Consequently, hard Euroscepticism would be principled opposition to EU accession, with an emphasis on the notion of threat. Soft Euroscepticism would define a policy oriented scepticism, which does not in principal reject EU accession.

Among mainstream parties in the period 1999–2002 the ANAP, CHP, DYP and DSP supported EU accession. They explained EU reforms in terms of Turkey’s need for democratisation. The CHP emphasised Turkey’s possible contribution to improved relations between Europe and the Muslim world. The ANAP articulated its contributions to Turkey’s accession process since the 1980s. The populist DYP, however, accused the EU of hypocrisy. It is important here to assess the Islamist parties’ positions on the issue. The AKP, which came to power in the 2002 elections, presented a pro-EU position.
The AKP’s supportive stance for the EU was tactical vis-à-vis the anti-Western Islamist Milli Görüş (National View) cleavage. Milli Görüş argued that ‘economic problems resulted from imperialist interventions of Western powers’. The AKP arose out of the SP (Felicity Party), which was the last party voicing this cleavage. Many Milli Görüş parties were in fact disbanded by the Constitutional Court for opposing laicism. The SP also ran the risk of closure. Milli Görüş faced the following dilemma: their ideology was anti-Western but the EU could provide them with the legal framework and legitimacy for the religious freedoms that they demanded. By choosing a pro-EU stance the AKP differentiated itself from the SP. While the AKP promised to carry through the legal and constitutional reforms necessary to reach the ‘level set by the Copenhagen criteria’, the SP moderated its Euroscepticism. The SP manifesto did not mention opposition to accession and, moreover, it proposed reforms in the same areas as the EU, such as torture and mistreatment, an extension of freedom of the press and an ‘extension of the freedom of religion in such a way as to pass beyond the debate on laicism’.

Pro-EU arguments aligned on the rationale of which harmonisation reforms were in Turkey’s interests. This alignment were set against Eurosceptic arguments about the harmful effects of harmonisation reform. It also led Eurosceptics to categorise them as a ‘camp’ pursuing their private interests.

As a coalition partner the MHP maintained a moderate Euroscepticism. It pursued this positioning during the elections. By criticising the EU’s ‘biased attitude on Cyprus, on the Kurds’ the MHP demanded guarantees prior to accession. It feared an EU threat to cultural identity and territorial integrity. Although the party used the ‘national sovereignty’ argument, its opposition targeted some harmonisation reforms and not membership as such. Therefore, despite its emphasis on national sovereignty, MHP Euroscepticism was policy oriented.

Consequently, the mainstream parties remained soft Eurosceptic. The MHP and SP Euroscepticism derived from ideology and electoral tactics, whereas the DYP opposition was tactical.

Among peripheral parties, the HAK PAR (the Rights and Freedoms Party) argued for the enhancement of Kurdish rights and freedoms and the transformation of regional authorities into regional parliaments. A pro-EU stance helped the party to pursue its objectives. Therefore, this single issue party manifests a pro-EU stance which can also be used as electoral strategy. The BTP (Independent Turkey Party, a right-wing nationalist and Islamist party) and IP (Workers Party, a Maoist nationalist party) manifestos converged on the notion of threats by the EU, whereas the TKP (the Communist Party of Turkey) criticised the EU’s policy orientation for being too liberal and imperialistic. In line with Taggart and Szczerbiak’s theory, the populist single issue party BTP adopted a hard line because of its low political cost. The IP and TKP opposition derived from ideology. The IP’s hard Euroscepticism relates to its nationalist understanding of leftism. This positioning explains its alignment with the right within the Ulusalı camp. The MHP’s rapprochement with the left wing after the election also derives from ideology (national interest and nationalism). The MHP aimed to assert its image as ‘the only opponent’ of the EU within the coalition. It is meaningful that the Ulusalılar became stronger after 2002. Their formation was affected by this polarisation along a national sovereignty–liberalisation axis under conditionality. On the basis of the analysis of the mainstream and peripheral parties, it is possible to categorise parties as shown in Table 2.
It can be inferred that a certain level of soft Euroscepticism was a general pattern for all parties. Parties could not avoid soft Euroscepticism because of uncertainty about their membership and public mistrust. There are differences in the degree of scepticism between these parties which this categorisation fails to reflect. This is due to the choice of the independent variable, which draws broad categories. However, another independent variable would fail in positing the difference between those who emphasised the notion of threat and those who did not. Thus the MHP and SP fall in the same category as the ANAP, the CHP, etc., although they are more sceptical.

On the ‘EU issue’ parties polarised regardless of the left–right dimension. Party positioning followed the national sovereignty–liberalisation axis. That was because pro-accession parties converged on the argument that the EU catalysed reform in Turkey. This convergence led hard Eurosceptics to qualify them as a ‘camp’. It is worth remembering that each party’s positioning along the axis varied as to the EU issue in question. For instance, on liberalisation of the use of the Kurdish language in education the ANAP was on the liberalisation side whereas the MHP stood on the national sovereignty side. On the Cyprus issue all parties positioned themselves on the national sovereignty side. The sizes of the parties mattered in positioning and determining the degree of Euroscepticism.

Party-based Euroscepticism in Turkey converged with the CEEC on the following points. As the MHP case shows, a mainstream status prevented parties from embracing hard Euroscepticism. There was a consensus amongst the mainstream parties within the CEEC on EU accession; with the exception of Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, in which some mainstream parties were Eurosceptic. Only peripheral parties adopted hard Euroscepticism. Although peripheral Eurosceptic parties were on both the left and right, it was the right-wing parties that voiced hard Euroscepticism. In Turkey the right emphasised the notion of threat.

The Turkish case differs from the CEEC on the following points. The mainstream parties remained somewhat soft Eurosceptic because of the public mistrust in the EU and the uncertainty of accession. This positioning was due to polarisation along the national sovereignty–liberalisation axis.

**Conclusion**

This article has examined Turkish Euroscepticism in relation to Euroscepticism in Eastern Europe. The objective was to assess the extent to which the accession process may erode motivations for accession. The CEEC and Turkey have been chosen because of the strong desire for accession and the pre-accession strategies that have been applied.

Having analysed CEEC Euroscepticism, the following results were identified. At the public level a strong desire to ‘return to Europe’ led people to judge the EU in terms of their expectations and idealisations, rather than using cost–benefit analysis. Public Euroscepticism derived from the divide between expectations and the EU’s actual performance. Strong
public and elite motivation can be overshadowed by the ways in which the accession process challenges national sovereignty. This results in a fall in public support and the positioning of political parties along the pro-market/libertarian–anti-market/authoritarian axes. Public Euroscepticism does not necessarily translate into party-based Euroscepticism. In fact, except for Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland party-based Euroscepticism has been in decline. The strength of Eurosceptic parties mostly depends on the party political structure within a country. A pro-EU consensus amongst mainstream parties and a less fragmented party political structure may filter out public Euroscepticism. Indeed, despite high levels of public Euroscepticism in Estonia, Eurosceptic parties have a low share of the vote. Also, Poland displays, exceptionally, a strong party-based Euroscepticism because of the fragmented nature of the party political structure and the EU’s low salience at the public level. It has also been seen that hard Eurosceptic parties appear on both the left and right, but that right-wing parties tend to articulate the issue of national sovereignty.

As in the CEEC, Turkey has a strong desire for accession. EU membership would seem a catalyst for finalisation of the modernisation project and for political and economic liberalisation. However, opposition to Turkish accession in Europe has generated a general public distrust (even among EU supporters), hence the feeling of uncertainty about accession. This mistrust has stimulated the emergence of the reactionary nationalist Ulusalcılar movement. This movement distinguishes itself by the notion of an EU threat to national and territorial integrity, whereas nationalist Eurosceptic movements in Eastern Europe use the national sovereignty argument. The Ulusalcılar is also particular in that it has led to a cooperation within civil society and between parties which transcends the left–right dimension. Even if this movement has not been as influential as expected, its presence and salience are socially and politically significant. The erosion of public support is worrying, since it might provoke a resurgence of the Ulusalcılar or other reactionary nationalist movements.

Analysis of the latest election results shows that the left–right dimension did not have an impact on party positioning, whereas the size of the party did. Mistrust and conditionality pushed parties to align along the national sovereignty–liberalisation axis. All parties displayed a certain level of soft Euroscepticism to differing degrees, because of public mistrust in relation to vote seeking approaches. Similarly to the CEEC, peripheral parties, from both the left and right, expressed hard Euroscepticism. Nationalist traits appeared predominantly amongst the right-wing parties.

It can be inferred that the accession process may erode support despite a high motivation for accession. It may lead to Eurosceptical and nationalist reactions. The patterns of reaction depend on country-specific conditions. In the particular context of Turkey a European reluctance to enlarge to include Turkey has generated public mistrust and an atypical nationalist reactions.

Notes


34 According to Yılmaz, ‘a citizen, who would vote yes in a referendum on Turkey’s membership in the EU, can also oppose the democratic and liberal reforms imposed by the EU. He can also be “eurosceptic” because of his perception of the EU as a Christian Club, the Cyprus issue etc.’ Yılmaz, H. (2003) *Europeanization and Its Discontents: Evidence from Turkey*, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, Marburg, Germany, 18–21 September.


37 Debates concerning a referendum on Turkish accession have reinforced the impression that accession would not take place whatever Turkey does and that conditionality was nothing more than a ‘loss of sovereignty’. Onur Oyimen (ex-ambassador and current vice president of the CHP) in a TV debate ‘Mots Croisés’ on France 2. Available online at: http://www.onuroyimen.com/docs/gorselbasin50.doc (accessed 10 June 2006).
“49% of the respondents said that they viewed the EU as a Christian Club that was closed to Muslim countries, while 42% of them believed that there was place in the EU for a Muslim country like Turkey. Similarly, 48% of the respondents said that the EU will definitely not admit Turkey to full membership, even if Turkey has fulfilled all the accession criteria, whereas only about 29% said that the EU will accept Turkey as a full member once Turkey has met the Copenhagen Criteria for membership”. Yılmaz, H. (2003) Europeanization and Its Discontents: Evidence from Turkey, p. 2, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, Marburg, Germany, 18–21 September.


40 Declarations by the MHP (the Nationalist Movement Party), the RP (Welfare Party), the IP (Workers Party), the TKP (the Communist Party of Turkey) and the DSP (the Democratic Left Party), as well as members of civil society. Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, Foreign Policy on Domestic Media Archives, December 2002.


43 Oran, B. (2004) Türk Dış Politikas [Turkish Foreign Policy], pp. 70–90 (Istanbul: İletişim).


45 ‘Tuˇrk oğ˘un, c¸alıs¸, gu¨ven’ [Turk, be proud of yourself, work hard and be self confident]. Quote from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

46 The adjective is used in the sense of Yılmaz Ta¸skın, who defined reactionism as: a paradigm which sticks to a certain moment of history and tries to restore it, hence refuses change as such. Yılmaz reminded us that, in contrast to reactionism, conservatism does not deny change but tries to control it so as to preserve fundamentals of the already existing system. Ta¸skın, Y. (2003) Muhaçazârâkhîn uslanmaz çoçuqû: reaksiyonerlîk [Reactionism: the spoiled child of conservatism], in: Muhaçazârâkhîr, Modern Türkiye’dê Sıvasî Dü¸şüncê [Conservatism, Political Thought in the Modern Turkey], Vol. 5, p. 187 (Istanbul: İletişim).

One of the Ulusalcı conferences illustrates the heterogeneous and reactionary profile of the Ulusalcılar. The conference title and the profiles of the participants are significant. The conference on ‘the Turks, the Armenians and the truth in history’ was held at the University of Muğla on 3–4 December 2005 and gathered together such eminent people as Prof. Türkkaya Atao˘v (writer and scholar), Sinan Aygün (the head of the Chamber of Commerce in Ankara), Şenol Bal (the president of the Association of Turkish World Women’s Friendship and Solidarity), Orhan Çekic (the secretary general of the UBK), Onur Öymen (former Turkish ambassador and vice president of the CHP), Turan Çömez (AKP—the pro-EU Islamist party in the government—member of Parliament), Doğu Perinçek (the IP leader), Şener Erugu˘r (retired general), Prof. Mustafa Erkal (head of Aydınlar Ocag˘ı), Nüzhet Kardashian (former ambassador), Prof. Enver Konukçu (vice president of the centre-right DYP, the True Path party), Dr Ahag Oktay Güner (retired general). Nouvelles d’Armënie, Nouveau Symposium Négationniste à l’Université Turque de Muğla, 24 April 2006. Available online at: http://www.armenews.com/article.php3?id_article-20006 (accessed 6 June 2006).


50 İlhan Selçük has been involved in the left since the 1960s. Following Maoism and Kemalism, Selçük argued that first the national democratic revolution should be finalised. In order to realise social, political and economic transformation Selçük believed the left could cooperate with the army and national bourgeoisie. Ênsal, A. (2002) Umutanın Yalnızçı˘g˘a Türkiye Iç˘i Partisi [From Hope to Solitude, Workers Party of Turkey], pp. 318–319 (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları).
Kuvay-i Milliye denotes the popular resistance movement that emerged within the occupied regions of the Ottoman Empire following the treaty of Sèvres. Kuvay-i Milliye resulted from popular initiatives, with the local forces later being unified under Mustafa Kemal’s leadership.


Aydınk (2005, January 12) Mu‘dafa-ı Hukuk Cemiyeti was the name of the organisation which gathered together Kuvay-i Milliye (local resistance movements) from different regions. The wording emphasizes the immediacy of the threat, the Sèvres syndrome, and calls for mobilisation.


Hakimiyet-i Milliye (national sovereignty) was originally an influential newspaper during the war of independence. It gathers together eminent people such as Prof. Erol Manisalı, former prosecutor of the Turkish Supreme Court, Vural Savası, etc.


Affiliated to the nationalist MHP.

Yeni Mesaj is the newspaper of the BTP (Independent Turkey Party), founded on 25 September 2001. A link to the party exists on the official website of the newspaper.

Unofficial paper of the EMEP, the Party of Labour. The EMEP website displays a link to Evrensel, and indicates that information on the EMEP can be obtained on Evrensel (http://www.vekilblog.com/emepistanbul).

This magazine belongs to the Communist Workers Party of Turkey (TKIP).

Affiliations with the Kemalist Thinking Associations.


