

INTRODUCTION

Christian Democratic (CD) social movements entered the scene in the second half of the 19th century. Initiated by the elites, these movements spread among workers, farmers, businessmen and the middle classes. The Catholics organised into clubs and associations along socioeconomic lines, in Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, as in other Western European countries. CD organisations started out as institutions with educative and cultural functions. In some countries, they developed into more organised and functional associations responding to the daily and/or professional needs of their members. Using the level of responsiveness and support as criteria, this paper qualifies CD institutions that better responded to the daily and professional needs of their members as being more influential.

The historical records convey that, of the five countries, only in the Netherlands and Belgium did all types of CD associations were more influential. In Germany, CD associations became more influential across some categories and among the Catholics. In France and Italy, although some CD associations acquired some influence over a certain period, the regimes undercut the movements. (See the table at Appendix I for a summary of CD associations across countries in terms of responsiveness and support) It follows that there is a pattern that recurs across all groups and countries. However, the countries displayed disparate domestic structures and dynamics, and entered industrialisation at different times, even if they all faced the rise of anticlericalism, socialism and unregulated capitalism. How is it possible that similar independent variables, after being filtered by disparate domestic setups, yield to similar results? In

other words, why are CD social movements more influential across all socioeconomic groups in some countries, even if the impacts of industrialisation and secularisation, the dynamics of state building, the distribution of power between societal actors vary?

Kalyvas explicates the emergence of CD movements as a laymen reaction to the anticlerical attacks by the liberals. CD parties in his perspective are the unintended consequences of the decisions by the Church and lay Catholics. (Kalyvas: 1996) Alternatively, van Kersbergen explains the emergence of CD as a reaction to socialism. For him, CD progressively broke off with Church control and upper class paternalism, and developed a distinct political stance. (van Kersbergen: 1995) Although it perfectly captures the causal mechanisms underlying the rise of CD parties, Kalyvas' anti-liberalism argument does not fully account for CD social movements. The latter also featured anti-socialist patterns. van Kersbergen's theory combining anti-socialism and anti-paternalism is better suited. Yet, van Kersbergen describes an intra-movement dynamic which fails to account for cross-country convergences across socioeconomic groups. The puzzle that this paper seeks to unravel is one in which some domestic level mechanism or mechanisms filtered the same independent variables in a way to produce convergence across countries. Lipset & Rokkan's cleavage theory can be insightful, for the authors demonstrate how the four major conflicts that the Western European states went through produced similar cleavages, cross-sectional convergences so to speak. The cleavages took shape as to the way in which a given country solved the centre-periphery, church-state, urban-worker and urban-rural conflicts.¹ This paper contends that a

¹ Lipset, S. and Rokkan, S. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments". in ed. Mair, P., *The West European Party System*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.

combination of the cleavage, anti-socialism and anti-paternalism theories may shed light on the convergences. It is argued that the causal mechanism lies in Catholic minority. The hypothesis is that in the countries without a Catholic minority, the religious question played out within the framework of the church-state conflict; squeezed between the regime oppression and the constraints by the Church, CD movements followed an arrested development process. This hypothesis is tested within the contexts of Italy, Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

The argument is structured in two parts. The first section considers the structural variables to sort out whether and if so, what type of transformations they actuated in the five polities. It begins by examining the country-specific implications of industrialisation, democratisation and secularisation. The reason is twofold; firstly, as Kalyvas and van Kersbergen have separately documented CD movements emerged in reaction to socialism and anticlerical attacks; and secondly, CD social movements follow the general trend of the rising mass politics. In so doing, the objective is to see how these three processes filtered by the domestic socio-political structures affected the distribution of power among socioeconomic groups, and the Catholic minority in particular. The section proceeds with an analysis of the Vatican's response to the attacks on religion, the social question and the 'threats' by unregulated liberalism and socialism. The Vatican's strategy is worth considering, because it is the authority that defines the guidelines to Catholic actions at the domestic level. The second part makes a cross-sectional analysis of the development of CD social movements across socioeconomic groups. It dwells upon the actors; namely priests and lay Catholics that initiated CD institutions. The paper employs

the secondary sources such as scholarly books and articles on CD, industrialisation, and the history of the countries under scrutiny, as well as the primary sources such as official publications, and memoirs.

I. Christian Democracy & Socioeconomic Transformations in Europe from the 1850s to the World War II

CD associations started out as local initiatives to find a Christian solution to the social question and the challenges by socialism. They took cues from national churches and the Vatican. To comprehend what and why they were reacting to we need to understand the environment in which they emerged, as well as what sort of directions they received from the Church. Hence, this section begins by examining the patterns of industrialisation, democratisation and secularisation in France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. It moves on to analysing what sort of reactions the social question and the rise of socialism engendered in Vatican. In so doing, this section also controls for an alternative explanation which suggests that the cross-sectional convergences across CD movements follow from the similar implications of industrialisation, democratisation and secularisation in the five countries.

I. I. Patterns of Socioeconomic Transformation

The 19th century staged major transformations that affected all Western European polities, and contributed to the emergence of CD movements. At the origins of the social question resided industrialisation. One common impact of industrialisation was to shift production from primary production (i.e. agriculture, fishing, forestry) toward

manufacturing and commercial and service activities. Factory emerged as a 'new' unit of production, and degraded the place of household in economic activity. Output, consumption and trade made a leap forward with the new techniques, the progress in transportation, information and machinery. The spread of factory-based production weakened small and medium size production units; and conducted to proletarianisation; that is, the emergence of a large class of workers who depend on a wage for survival.² Accordingly, the number of propertied peasants, manufacturers and artisans shrank, while the size of the proletariat bloated. Economic modernisation occurred at the cost of pauperism and social dislocation, which mainly targeted the proletariat and the middle classes. The social question instigated discontent and challenged the established social order. These transformations occurred in all five countries but at different pace and at different times.

Another grand transformation that affected inter-class relations in the 19th century Europe was democratisation. After having challenged the traditional authorities (i.e. the monarchy, the Church and traditional elites) and obtained the right to political participation, the bourgeoisie across Europe had become the most influential strata by the 1850s.³ The working classes were not yet at a position to counterpoise bourgeois primacy; they were not entirely mobilised and did not have political rights. Elite monopoly over power positions was justified by the argument that ordinary people lacked the necessary skills, sophistication and experience for political participation. This conviction

² Tilly, C. "Did the Cake of Custom Break?" in ed. Merriman, J. *Consciousness and Class Experience in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1979, p. 29.

³ Maier, C. *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp.5-8.

was not entirely groundless. Lower classes had to wait until the 1880s to fully develop values, motivation, skills and means to stand up against paternalism and fight for their rights themselves. What enabled this shift were the efforts by the elites and ideologues in Western Europe to organise and train the lower strata through grassroots organisations. These efforts succeeded in recruiting charismatic leaders, who in turn, organised their peers. From the 1880s to the World War I (WWI), European countries witnessed the rise of the masses. The masses organised demonstrations, strikes and public meetings. This national and autonomous form of contestation superposed the old parochial and patronised repertoire of collective action.⁴ Popular uprisings progressively undercut elite authority; hence by the 1920s, masses countervailed upper classes in politics.⁵ This transformation did not occur without conflicts; the specificities of the confrontations took shape according to the domestic class structure, institutional setup, power relations and the patterns of industrialisation. Such being the common impacts of the grand transformations let us see the country specific implications.

Unlike France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy were all late industrialisers. They entered the industrialisation stage at different times, and they reaped benefits at different levels. Although some countries prospered more than others, overall industrialisation boosted productivity and wealth. Crafts' study (see the table I below⁶) corroborates that GNP per capita augmented for all countries over the 19th century. From

⁴ Tilly, C. "Nineteenth-Century Origins of Our Twentieth-Century Collective-Action Repertoire", prepared for presentation to the conference on Economy and Society in the Twentieth Century in honor of Tom Burns, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, Scotland, September 1988.

⁵ Hobsbawm, E. *The Age of Empire, 1875-1914*, New York: Pantheon, 1987, p. 94.

⁶ Crafts, N.F. R. "Growth in France and Britain, 1830-1910: A Review of the Evidence", *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Mar., 1984), p.51.

1850 to 1910, GNP per capita almost doubled for Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Italy displayed a slower growth rate, approximately 17%.

TABLE 1
PER CAPITA PRODUCT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE
(in 1970 American dollars)

| Country | 1830 | 1850 | 1870 | 1890 | 1910 |
|---------------|------|------|------|-------|-------|
| Great Britain | 498 | 660 | 904 | 1,130 | 1,302 |
| France | 343 | 432 | 567 | 668 | 883 |
| Belgium | | 534 | 738 | 932 | 1,110 |
| Denmark | 382 | 489 | 563 | 708 | 1,050 |
| Switzerland | | | 589 | 750 | 992 |
| Germany | | 418 | 579 | 729 | 958 |
| Netherlands | | 481 | 591 | 768 | 952 |
| Austria | | | 466 | 664 | 802 |
| Sweden | | | 351 | 469 | 763 |
| Italy | | | 467 | 466 | 548 |

Note: Countries defined by boundaries as of dates given; "Austria" is Cisleithania.
Source: Crafts, "Gross National Product," Table 1, which gives further estimates.

Kuznets study of the patterns of growth in the periods from the 1830s to the 1870s, and from the 1870s to the 1930s suggests decelerating growth rate in France by, respectively (over the abovementioned decades), 26.3%, 15.7% and 18.4%. Population growth and per capita product also slumped over the same periods. The Netherlands started with lower growth rates at the onset but outstripped French performance over time; (respectively, 20.3%, 33% and 29.8%). Growth rate for population and per capita product followed the similar acceleration pattern. The Italian state, also due to unification, started industrialisation later. From 1895 to 1925, Italian economy grew by 24.6%, which nevertheless remained below the French rate but above the Dutch performance.⁷ With regards to Germany, Tilly informs us that net per capita GDP leaped from 260 to 728 Deutsche marks (in 1913 prices) from 1825 to 1914, which corresponds to an increase

⁷ Kuznets, S. *Economic Growth of Nations: Total Output and Production Structure*, Cambridge: Harvard UP, p. 97.

by 2.8.⁸ Overall, although France started industrialisation earlier, its growth had a slower pace. Belgian economy fared better by the 1860s; it propelled growth in Germany and France.⁹ On the other hand, Germany outstripped both Belgium and France after the 1860s, realising the fastest and highest growth rate in Europe. These findings approbate that the five countries prospered at different levels; let us now see whether the social and political implications of industrialisation also differed.

TABLE 4
SOME ASPECTS OF DIVERSE STRUCTURE AMONG HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES
(agricultural variables when income per capita reached \$900 in American dollars)

| <i>Country</i> | <i>Year</i> | <i>Proportion of Income Originating in Agriculture and Extractive Industry</i> | <i>Proportion of the Labor Force in Agriculture and Extractive Industry</i> |
|----------------|-------------|--|---|
| Great Britain | 1870 | 18.8 | 15.3 |
| Belgium | 1890 | 11.0 | 32.1 |
| Denmark | 1900 | 29.9 | 46.6 |
| Germany | 1900 | 32.2 | 39.9 |
| Netherlands | 1910 | n.a. | 28.4 |
| Switzerland | 1900 | n.a. | 34.6 |
| France | 1910 | 27.6 | 41.8 |

| | <i>Percentage of Exports by Value in Manufactures, 1910</i> |
|---------------|---|
| Great Britain | 76.1 |
| Belgium | 37.0 |
| Denmark | 5.1 |
| Germany | 74.3 |
| Netherlands | 20.9 |
| Switzerland | 75.5 |
| France | 59.2 |

Note: n.a. = not available.

Source: Crafts, "Patterns of Development," Tables 5 and 7.

⁸ Tilly, R. "German Industrialisation", in ed. Teich, M. and Porter, R. *The Industrial Revolution in National Context*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996, p.96.

⁹ Strikwerda, C. *A house divided: Catholics, Socialists, and Flemish nationalists in nineteenth-century Belgium*. Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, p.33.

Crafts study reaffirms the inference that Germany achieved the highest growth rates at the fastest speed¹⁰; by the 1910s it ranked second in export. Agriculture however, still accommodated 40% of labour force. Railway construction initiated German industrialisation while cartelisation and large investment banks enabled the emergence of big enterprises (especially in heavy industry). Protectionism conserved the predominance of the agricultural elites.

German industry concentrated in Ruhr and Rhineland-Westphalia where the Catholic minority lived.¹¹ Tariffs and low wages (around the subsistence level) for unskilled workers allowed Germany to keep production costs lower, which explicates its high export performance. On the other hand, labour and capital-intensive industry accompanied by rapid urbanisation (the fastest in Europe) yielded to a skewed income distribution across socioeconomic groups as well as between rural and urban areas.¹² Wages for unskilled workers did not go beyond the subsistence level; the skilled workers alone reached the living standards of the petty bourgeoisie.¹³ Social inequalities touched the Catholics more than the Protestants.¹⁴ Pauperisation created a large frustrated and disoriented working class, which propelled unionisation. However, the alliance between the traditional elites and the German bureaucracy opposed trade unions and social protests. Petty bourgeoisie and the farmers, showing traditionalist and authoritarian tendencies also

¹⁰ Crafts, *op.cit.*, p.55.

¹¹ Gerschenkron, A. *Economic backwardness in historical perspective, a book of essays*, New York, Praeger, 1965.

¹² Tilly, R. in ed. Teich, M. and Porter, R. *op.cit.*, pp.98-117.

¹³ Brose, E. *German history: 1789 - 1871: from the Holy Roman Empire to the Bismarckian Reich*, Providence, Berghahn 1997, p.213.

¹⁴ Cary, N. *The Path to Christian Democracy: German Catholics and the Party System from Windthorst to Adenauer*, London: Harvard UP, 1996, p.19.

sided with the bureaucracy and the elites. Oppression targeted both socialist and CD TUs.¹⁵

State oppression and social question added to denominational differences in the state building process in Germany. The French revolution, the Napoleonic governments and the Enlightenment ideas had already impaired the position of the Catholic Church and had undercut religiosity in Germany. The Church received intense anticlerical attacks with regards to its property rights, schooling and other privileges in the first half of the century. Most religious associations, brotherhoods, artisan guilds and alike were abolished. In addition, the German monarchy feared the mitigation of the society along confessional lines. Thereupon, the state enhanced control on Catholicism from the 1840s onwards.

In the second half of the century, lay Catholics set up organisations along socioeconomic groups against the German state. These institutions expanded in the regions with a Catholic concentration; namely, Ruhr and Rhineland-Westphalia.¹⁶ These regions had pioneered industrialisation. In these areas, denominational differences added to social inequalities. Moreover, being a regional minority the Catholics faced oppression and discrimination by the centre. This confrontation was a minority-majority conflict in essence; but the German state framed it as a denominational problem. Accordingly, the religious issue was elaborated within the framework of state building. One proof is the

¹⁵ Kaelble, H. "Social Stratification in Germany in the 19th and 20th Centuries: A Survey of Research since 1945", *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 10th Anniversary Issue: Social History Today and Tomorrow? (Winter, 1976), pp.147-150.

¹⁶ Sperber, J. "Roman Catholic Religious Identity in Rhineland-Westphalia, 1800-70: Quantitative Examples and Some Political Implications", *Social History*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Oct., 1982), pp.311-316.

establishment of the Zentrum party, a regional party representing the Catholic minority. Most non-Catholic Germans took its foundation as provocation.¹⁷ This party with centrifugal tendencies showed ardent opposition to the German state. Over time, Kulturkampf alleviated new Catholic generations' opposition to the German state. Zentrum, progressively losing influence, became aconfessional like other denominational parties, as democratic rules gained wider acceptance.¹⁸

France was another leading export country with a high percentage of labour force in agriculture. Revenues from agriculture constituted 30% of the total income. One reason was that small independent peasantry managed agricultural activity. Agricultural proletariat remained relatively narrower in France even if some regions witnessed migration. Industrialisation started in urban areas, in the textile and mining sectors. By the 1870s, industrial cities emerged in the Northern France; i.e. Reims, Alsace-Lorraine and Champagne. Also in the centre south part of the country, some cities became renowned for mining and metalworking, i.e. Grenoble.¹⁹ Living standards remained low, which caused strikes and protests towards the end of the 19th century.²⁰

France displayed a rather homogeneous religious composition. However, the French society suffered from the divide between the republicans/revolutionaries and the monarchists. In the nation building process, the place of the Church in society became a

¹⁷ Cary, *op.cit.*, p.13.

¹⁸ Kalyvas, S. *The rise of Christian Democracy in Europe*, Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, 1996, pp.210-213.

¹⁹ Crouzet, F. "France", in ed. Teich, M. and Porter, *op.cit.*, pp.47-50.

²⁰ Tilly, L. A. "Paths of Proletarianization: Organization of Production, Sexual Division of Labor, and Women's Collective Action", *Signs*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Development and the Sexual Division of Labor (Winter, 1981), pp. 402-413.

regime issue; because the latter had a long-standing tradition of siding with the monarchy. After the French Revolution and under the imperial regime, education became a public service whose management the state left to the church. Given that education influenced voters' preferences, the state closely watched and supervised Church activity with regards to schooling.²¹ Under the second republic, state oppression eased for about two decades and revived around the 1870s, the Church organised lay Catholics together with the alienated elites.²² The traditional elites adopted the religious issue; but used it also to advocate against monarchy via the various branches of the Catholic Action movement. Leon Harmel, de Mun, Tour de la Pin were among the leading figures.²³ Yet, its organisational network was weaker and its rivals were stronger. The republicans had greater support. Socialism and syndicalism were stronger and more committed in France than elsewhere.²⁴ Hence, liberal attacks on the Catholics happened to be harsher than in other European countries. In effect, Protestant organisations underwent less oppression than their Catholic equivalents. What is more, the Papacy revised its anti-republican position. The Pope Leo VIII in 1889 'rallied' the Catholics to the state contending that all governments were the only legitimate instance to legislate on the social question; therefore the Catholics had to cooperate with the Republic.²⁵ This reversal, called the *Ralliement*, added to the ongoing mitigation within the Catholic milieus. Some groups, i.e. the Sillonists, already advocated the separation of the Church and state. The French state resolved the issue by adopting laicism and the Concordat of 1905 that officially separated

²¹ Irving, R.E.M. *Christian Democracy in France*, London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, 1973, p.21.

²² Lipset and Rokkan, *op.cit.*, pp.126-127.

²³ Flower, J.E. "Forerunners of the Worker-Priests", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 2, No. 4, Church and Politics (Oct., 1967), pp. 184-185.

²⁴ Thorpe, W. "The European Syndicalists and War, 1914-1918", *Contemporary European History*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Mar., 2001), pp. 18-19.

²⁵ Irving, *op.cit.*, p.31.

the church and the state. Overall, the issue of secularisation took shape along the Church vs. the State conflict.

The table depicts Belgium as an export country with a developed agricultural sector. Belgium managed to develop both its agricultural sector and industry in a relatively short period of time. Industrial production tripled from 1880s to 1913.²⁶ Industrialisation dwelled upon the comparative advantage of lower wages with longer working hours. However, it heavily leaned on the international market. The Liberals and Catholics in the country favoured free trade and kept prices low for international competitiveness; which however, resulted in poverty and relatively poorer living standards for lower classes at home.²⁷

Industrialisation concentrated in the Walloon part.²⁸ Although regional concentration of industrialisation crosscut cultural differences, Belgium distinguished from Germany in that cultural groups were not minorities; hence the centre-periphery type of liberal vs. Catholic confrontation did not come about in Belgium. Because most liberals were catholic, and most Catholics (unlike the Catholics elsewhere) supported constitutional state and constitutional freedom of religion, the antagonist groups agreed on the state. Accordingly, even if the liberals initially attempted to annul state funding to denominational schools, they acquiesced to public support, while the Catholics admitted the established state church. Lay support to CD party undeniably played part in the process. More importantly however, the fear of foreign occupation enhanced the support for the state. The erstwhile

²⁶ Strikwerda, *op.cit.*, p.97.

²⁷ Strikwerda, *op.cit.*, p.34.

²⁸ Van Der Wee, H. "The Industrial Revolution in Belgium", in ed. Teich, M. and Porter, *The Industrial Revolution in National Context: Europe and the USA*, New York: Cambridge UP, 1996, pp.68-72.

Protestant dislike in the Belgian society (as a result of their past domination by the Netherlands) was one reason for the Liberals to stick to Catholicism. The French threat was another reason why the Catholics did not dare weaken the state. Overall, the liberal-Catholic entente sustained stability in Belgium, despite the disruptive effects of the transition to mass politics. The stability however, retarded the adoption of universal suffrage until 1894 (versus 1871 in Germany and in France).²⁹ In sum, in Belgium, the issue of secularisation did not build on a centre-periphery dimension. Secularisation took place in parallel to the state building on the basis of a societal compromise.

In contrast to its neighbour, the Netherlands underwent industrialisation at a slower pace. The Dutch economy by the early 19th century relied on heavily on agriculture. Industrialisation commenced in the textile industry from the 1830s to the 1850s, in the Southern part of the country characterised by a Catholic minority, thanks to the purposeful construction of roads and canals to propel regional integration. It gained momentum in the areas linked to colonial trade, and paper and gas industries. From the 1850s to the 1880s, the government deliberately adopted liberal policies to boost heavy industry. Metallurgy made a leap forward over this period, but then stagnated from the 1890s to the 1910s.

Industrialisation in the Netherlands displayed a patchy character due to policy reversal in the second half of the century. The Netherlands provided poor living standards to the working class.³⁰ Social question prepared the ground for socialism; yet, religious and

²⁹ Strikwerda, *op.cit.*, pp.28-29.

³⁰ Van Zanden, J.L. "Industrialisation in the Netherlands", in ed. Teich, M. and Porter, *op.cit.*, pp.81-89.

cultural differences crosscut the classes. The industrialised Catholic regions in the South showed strong centrifugal tendencies.³¹ In the second half of the 19th century, the Catholic Church, previously a marginalised organisation, empowered enough to challenge the state. The controversy started when the state made it more difficult for the Church to obtain financial support and to set up denominational schools, which however, was a constitutional right of the latter. In addition to the issues of schooling and charity, the Church opposed the Calvinist elite (controlling the bureaucracy) with regards to the exclusion of the Catholics from the public sector. The Church mobilised laymen through workers' associations, youth movements, sports organisations and alike. The clergy called upon the believers not to send children to public schools, opt out from state organised charity etc. They closely watched the believers and sanctioned defectors. Later, they set up a Catholic party, which entered the Parliament. One factor that increased the issue salience was the identity question; the Dutch nation was traditionally associated with Protestantism.³² The rules of the democratic game compelled the two fronts to collaborate in the Parliament. The Protestant-Catholic collaboration built an opposition bloc by the 1870s. When they obtained the majority by the end of 1880s, they passed the law establishing state support to Christian schools. In time, the government adopted corporate pluralism and pillarisation as solution to the religious minority problem. In other words, in the Netherlands, the religious issue overlapped with the centre-periphery conflict.

³¹ Lipset and Rokkan, *op.cit.*, p.131-p.126.

³² Sengers, E. "Although We Are Catholic, We Are Dutch": The Transition of the Dutch Catholic Church from Sect to Church as an Explanation for Its Growth and Decline", *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar., 2004), pp. 131-32.

Finally, for Italy, industrialisation started in the silk and cotton sectors in Piedmont and Lombardy by the 1850s. With mechanisation, agriculture, locomotive, printing and textile sectors expanded in Turin, Milan, Naples, Piedmont and Lombardy. After unification, the Italian state deliberately favoured some groups in policy making to create large landowners and businessmen through investment banks, protectionism and low wages. From the 1900s to the WWI, Italian industry and investment spurred such that Italy ranked the third in industrial products in the textile and silk sectors.

Prosperity however, confined to the north. The traditional elites in the south were discontent with industrialisation and the new Italian state.³³ They endorsed protectionism and regulations but these demands overlapped with the divide between the Catholics and anticlericalism. In reaction to the Piedmontese attempts to exert the state power, the Pope refused to recognise state authority, democratic politics. The Church mobilised the Catholics through Catholic Actions. From the late 1860s to the 1880s when the new Pope took office, the Church ardently struggled against the Italian state. The struggle ended by the foundation of the Vatican state in 1929. Then, the pope lifted the ban on democratic participation. Thus, the religious question played out with regards to the Church vs. State conflict.

It follows that industrialisation and democratisation that contributed to the emergence of CD engendered parallel conflicts i.e. pauperisation, social dislocation, socialist critiques etc. This finding falls in line with van Kersbergen's thesis. Yet, their patterns varied across

³³ Poni, G. and Mori, G. "Italy in the Longue Duree", in ed. Teich, M. and Porter, *op.cit.*, pp.154-176.

Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and France according to the way in which these processes added to the existing social structure and power distribution. Secularisation was another factor that triggered CD movements, as was already captured by Kalyvas' study. This paper identified that secularisation coincided with the state building process. It caused polarisation between the Church and the state, or between the Catholic minority and the state. The countries with a catholic minority framed the secularisation issue as the centre-periphery conflict; i.e. Germany and the Netherlands. These two countries solved the issue in different ways. Kulturkampf (and later nationalism) in Germany adulterated confessionalism; the German state consolidated its authority at the expense of the Church. In the Netherlands, corporatist pluralism and pillarisation maintained territorial integrity. Both in Germany and the Netherlands, the fact that the Catholics were a regional minority helped frame the question as a centre-periphery issue; rather than a nationwide problem of religion. The countries without a religious minority elaborated secularisation with regards to the Church vs. state conflict. Its implications affected the whole population; hence the intensity of the conflict was higher, so was the pressure on the population both by the state and the Church. Unlike in France which ended up by adopting laicism, in Italy, the Vatican managed to gain its autonomy. Belgium stands out; secularisation did not pose an intense conflict since Belgian society was bicultural. Besides, the majority of the population followed Catholicism, and most liberals were Catholic. In the absence of a religious minority that can be stigmatised, the Liberal-Catholic alliance enhanced the constitutional state; the rights of the Church were guaranteed and delimited by the constitution. Having sketched the patterns of conflict, let us see how the Vatican responded to the major issues of the 19th century.

I. II. The Christian Democrat Ideology

To the attacks by the liberals and the state, national churches responded by mobilising lay Catholics. The argument that the individual was responsible for actively engaging in the social and political life brought normative justification to popular contest. Using their organisational networks, national churches launched popular catholic movements. These movements were reactionary by nature; which implicates that the Church did not have a concrete agenda when it actuated the organisational stage. The movements attracted believers from different socioeconomic backgrounds. In most countries, the movements expanded; except in France where the scope of the movement remained limited due to the Church's weaker position and its looser network across the country. The state-church conflict resolved through a social compromise. The outcome depended on the relative strength of the church and the state. In France, the process led to the legal and institutional separation in France, the recognition of the Vatican state in Italy, pillarisation in Belgium and the Netherlands, and by the retreat of the Church from the public sphere in Germany.

With regards to the social question, the Catholic Church's initial response pertained to charity and re-christianisation of the society against moral degradation. The Church disliked the idea of social class, for it mitigated social unity and overrode the autonomy of the persons, family and community.³⁴ It argued solidarity at the community, class and

³⁴ Dierickx, G. "Christian Democracy and Its Ideological Rivals: An Empirical Comparison in the Low Countries" in Hanley, D. *Christian democracy in Europe: a comparative perspective*, London: Wellington House, 1994, pp.16-24.

society level.³⁵ However, this religious perspective fell short to prevent social polarisation, as industrialisation and pauperisation intensified in the second half of the 19th century. The first concrete step came about when Pope Leo XIII issued *Rerum Novarum* (RN) in 1891 wherein he condemned unregulated capitalism and stressed the state's role in rectifying social injustices by protecting property rights and order. RN suggested corporatist bargaining (as opposed to class based bargaining) as a way to promote interclass cooperation and to restrain state intervention.³⁶ In short, the document tried to develop a Christian alternative to socialism; it was inspired by the corporatist ideas of catholic activists like de Mun. By accepting inequalities, it tried not to alienate the upper classes and to preclude revolution.³⁷ Leo XIII did not want to challenge established authorities, which explicates the tone of the document.

The Vatican elaborated its social teaching with *Quadragesimo Anno* (QA) in 1931. QA developed a critique of capitalism and argued for a welfare state to alleviate social costs. Reemphasising the role of interclass cooperation, it held that the employers should implement a fair level of wage to enable workers' self-development and to protect the family unit; and that the workers should participate in wage setting. The state should refrain from intervention, except for protecting property rights and redistribution.³⁸ The

³⁵ van Kersbergen, Kees, *Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State*, London and New York, Routledge, 2003.

³⁶ *Rerum Novarum*, the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labour, 1891, the Vatican archives, the official website, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo_xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum_en.html

³⁷ Marens, R, "Timing is Everything: Historical Contingency as a Factor in the Impact of Catholic Social Teaching Upon Managerial Practices", *Journal of Business Ethics*, 57, 2005, pp. 289-290.

³⁸ *Quadragesimo Anno*, Encyclical Of Pope Pius XI On Reconstruction Of The Social Order To Our Venerable Brethren, The Patriarchs, Primate, Archbishops, Bishops, And Other Ordinaries In Peace And Communion With The Apostolic See, And Likewise To All The Faithful Of The Catholic World, 1931, the Vatican archives, the official

novelties lay in the critique of capitalism and the concrete corporatist solutions to alleviate social costs. QA envisioned building an 'organic' community organised on a functional/vocational basis across social groups, and hierarchical levels, wherein each person held a particular place and status (in terms of gender, occupation and social class), and performed a specific role. Individual contributions would sum up to promote collective good. Overall, the Vatican progressively developed a social teaching against the perils of capitalism.

The catholic teaching applied to politics through subsidiarity. Subsidiarity principle, advanced by a German theologian of aristocrat origin Nell-Breuning, asserted that decisions be taken at the lowest level possible; higher levels, such as the government, should intervene only when local initiatives and capacity fell short to undertake some action. Subsidiarity empowered the individual by asserting that communities and institutions provide the latter with social conditions necessary for self-development and realisation.³⁹ It follows that the teaching envisioned free self-governing collectivities (family, association, locality, community, region, country in ascending order) that served the interests of the individuals. In other words, the Church reproduced in the catholic welfare state model the medieval social order by reconciling the primacy of the individual (in his rights, security, role, status and welfare) and collective good.

website, http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html

³⁹ Kohler, T. "A Rock on which One Can Build: Friendship, Solidarity and the Notion of Authority", in Brennan, P. *Civilizing Authority: Society, State, and Church*. Lanham: Lexington Books, p.109.

In addition to developing a doctrine, the Church mobilised the elites to launch Christian social movements across socioeconomic groups. This initiative developed, in the second half of the 19th century, into a network of organisations encompassing professional associations, organisations for youth, women and adults, political parties. At the onset, the Church patronised lay Catholic movements. Over time, these organisations escaped its control.⁴⁰ Catholic activists took their own initiative, developed organisational strategies and recruited new generations. Also, the early institutions operated according to a mixed strategy; that is, interclass cooperation. At this stage, upper class paternalism marked the movements. Class conflicts brought down elite paternalism some decades later. Lower classes took the lead of their own organisations at different periods; but by the eve of the WWII, they had all emancipated from Church and elite control.

It follows that the Vatican did not issue a full-fledged doctrine to combat the social question and socialism at the time it mobilised the Catholics. The Church did not develop a concrete strategy for collection action either. The early mixed strategy followed from the Christian precept of organic society, and proposed an alternative to socialism. However, the socioeconomic conditions did not permit a harmonious collaboration between classes. Conflict of interests and perceptions propelled the emancipation of the movements along craft lines. Thus, CD associations underwent specialisation. This transition occurred different pace across Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy. The next section will conduct a cross sectional analysis of the movements.

⁴⁰ Kalyvas, *op.cit.*, pp.25-33.

II. Christian Democrat Social Movements

The previous chapter identified the domestic implications of the structural variables. The social costs of industrialisation and democratisation produced the social question and propelled the rise of socialism and anticlericalism. These issues instigated reactions within the Catholic milieu. The Catholics were mobilised through mixed organisations, although the Vatican did not issue a concrete strategy and ideology as to how to combat the social question and socialism. In the countries without a Catholic minority the issue of religion was framed as a state-church conflict whereas it was framed as a centre-periphery conflict in the countries with a Catholic minority. This section looks at how these structural variables impacted the development of grassroots organisations. To remind, all CD associations started out with cultural and educative purposes, while some developed into more functional organisations responsive to the daily and professional demands of their members. This paper had qualified the latter as being more influential than others. It was hypothesised that the state-church conflict arrested the development of CD associations into more functional organisations. The country based in-depth analysis of the CD movements across socioeconomic categories will test this hypothesis.

II. I. Workers' Movements

Workers constituted a strategic category for the Catholic milieus; in reaction to the class-based socialist approach, CD promoted the mixed strategy to nurture cooperation and solidarity between the classes.

The origins of CD workers movements lie in workers' associations and clubs founded in the mid 19th century. In Germany, workers' movements emerged as a part of a larger

process of mass politics in relation to the social question. By the time CD TUs emerged, the socialist TUs had become a national movement while peasants' movements, Naval and Pan-German Leagues, and the anti-Semitic parties were burgeoning.⁴¹ The underlying cause was the social question. Earlier in the 1830s, workers used to externalise discontent with the poor living working conditions through 'daily forms' of protests; i.e. breaking windows, singing chants outside the factory etc. Around this time, the elites took the lead, as social catholicist ideas diffused from Austria into Germany. The Austrian conservative Müller was one such idea carriers. By the late 1830s, social Catholicism gained salience within catholic intellectual milieus. von Baader, Jorg in Bavaria, Moufang in Mainz began disseminating corporatism. Some Protestants; i.e. Rodbertus-Jagetzow, joined the movement. Inspired by these ideas, workers and other artisans in the industrialised regions began forming small secret associations and journeymen's clubs as an alternative to socialist TUs; i.e. the Brotherhood of the Workers.⁴² These initiatives alarmed most industrialists; in terms of timing, the Catholic critiques coincided with the escalating socialist critique of social conditions, whereupon the German state banned these associations. The clergy did not sympathise the idea of a CD TU either.

In the 1860s, the workmen's clubs began emerging; i.e. mineworkers association in the Ruhr. Following this intermediary stage, the first Christian labour unions emerged in the 1870s. Their mission was to educate the proletariat and to ensure interclass cooperation

⁴¹ Strikwerda, C. "Review: Catholic Working-Class Movements in Western Europe", *International Labor and Working-Class History*, No. 34, Fall, 1988, p.73.

⁴² Brose, *op.cit.*, pp.214-215.

following corporatism. Interclass cooperation translated as upper and middle class paternalism into practice. The businessmen and some bourgeoisie liked this form of management, partly because corporatism was a better choice than socialism, but also they counted on the priests in preventing the movement to turn into TUs.⁴³ Thus, the early workers' associations were of elitist nature; and this very institutional design limited the efficiency of the movement.⁴⁴

The transition from paternalism to self-governed movement started in the 1880s, when Fr. Hitze declared independence from the elite command; and founded the Workers' Welfare Association (Arbeiterwohl) in 1881. Arbeiterwohl established a network of TU branches and affiliated clubs, educational centres and friendly societies. These organisations dealt with workers' daily problems as well as issues at workplace. They recruited the next generation's working class leaders. On the other hand, the elite-driven organisations with an educative mission did not die away. Clerics and lay activists built up the People's League for Catholic Germany (Volksverein) in the Rhineland and the Catholic Labour Leagues (Katholische Arbeitervereine) in Munich and Berlin. Arbeitervereine was not a union per se; it was an umbrella organisation for local Church-sponsored workers' associations whose mission was economic and cultural self-help. Arbeitervereine published a weekly newspaper for raising awareness among the

⁴³ Brose, *op.cit.*, pp.217-220.

⁴⁴ Strikwerda, "Review" *op.cit.*, p.73.

proletariat.⁴⁵ Following Rerum Novarum, Volksverein allowed the working class leaders to take the lead.⁴⁶ Joseph Joos for instance, became the union leader.

In the 1880s, the Protestants set up organisations as well. A protestant chaplain Stöcker, who was in contact with high-level bureaucrats in Berlin, started the Christian Social movement. The objective was to preserve faith against atheism and nationalism. The movement was designed to provide some guidance on socioeconomic problems on which Evangelical churches remained silent and left the floor to social democrats. The Christian Social movement ardently advocated a social programme through state intervention. This standpoint distinguished this movement from others that argued self-help. The movement however, attracted mainly the middle class.

Meanwhile, August Brust found an interdenominational mineworkers' union. This was followed by the foundation of the Trade Union Federation in 1895. The alleviation of controls and sanctions under Kulturkampf enabled these initiatives. The federation organised some strikes and issued social programmes suggesting shorter working hours, exclusion of women and children from some type of labour, Sunday rest, housing, social insurance etc.⁴⁷ However, their activities remained limited due the opposition by the clergy, the bureaucracy and socialists.⁴⁸ Denominational differences also impaired the functioning of the unions. The underrepresentation of the Protestants and the inability to

⁴⁵ Cary, *op.cit.*, pp.26-27.

⁴⁶ Evans, E. "Adam Stegerwald and the Role of the Christian Trade Unions in the Weimar Republic", *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Jan., 1974), pp. 602-626.

⁴⁷ Fogarty, Michael, P. *Christian democracy in Western Europe, 1820-1953*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1974, p.176.

⁴⁸ Brose, E. *Christian labor and the politics of frustration in Imperial Germany*, Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1985, pp.37-60.

attract them tarnished their reputation, while disagreements between the Protestant and Catholic members hampered decision-making. Even if the federation did not sustain, it successfully channelled worker demands. The model inspired the Catholic deputies for an interdenominational alliance.⁴⁹

The Christian unions revived after the federation split up along denominational lines. The Christian Social movement for instance, revived in the 1900s in the Protestant districts of Rhineland and Westphalia. Stöcker's and his collaborators' contacts with the Dutch Protestants underlay the movement's success in West Germany. Stöcker formulated workers' demands in an agenda that he brought to Reichstag. Stöcker's movement was successful at the onset; but it later divided on the issue of anti-Semitism. Stöcker himself an antisemitist, alienated some members. One group joined the liberals, the other the socialists. Stöcker's movement maintained close links to the state. By the end of the WWI, the Protestant circles and the Evangelical church decided to delineate from the state; the church in particular tried to promote interdenominational cooperation.⁵⁰ Catholic movements had the same intentions. In the 1900s, they tried to strike a bargain between the CD parliamentarians and TUs, and to form a non-socialist front. Lay Catholics' resistance to cooperate with the Protestants aborted these attempts. In addition to the denominational differences, class conflicts challenged CD TUs; the proletariat did not want to collaborate with the Christian bourgeois.⁵¹ Moreover, the rivals, the iron-rye coalition and the socialist, were too powerful to let the Christian TUs undertake a

⁴⁹ Cary, *op.cit.*, p.23.

⁵⁰ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, pp.180-183.

⁵¹ Brose, *Christian labor... op.cit.*, pp.217-38.

coalition.⁵² One example would be high tariff decisions. Christian TUs had to acquiesce to this decision due to the convoluted power relations in the Parliament, which made them lose workers' support. Not only the socialist party won the elections next year in the Catholic strongholds, but also Christian workers began joining the socialists TUs.⁵³ By 1914 approximately 800 000 Catholic workers had transferred to the socialist TUs, whereas the number of Catholic workers affiliated to the Christian unions and Catholic workers' clubs remained around 600 000.⁵⁴ Overall, German CD workers' movement failed to propose an alternative to the socialists. Still, they successfully voiced workers' interests and found solutions to some local problems at the workplace. CD TUs lived their heyday between 1902 and 1913, when the number of their members grew slightly faster than socialists TUs. Still, on the whole, their size equalled 1/7th of the socialist TUs.⁵⁵ Denominational differences also got in the way of CD workers' movements.

In France, the origins of the Catholic question go back from the 1820s. CD social movements however, came out around the 1870s. Most conditions were riper for CD movement than in elsewhere. The country was undergoing poverty and intense class conflicts; it accommodated a vivid ideological environment; Catholic intellectuals and priests such as Sangnier, de Mun, Lamennais, Ozanam, Lacordaire disseminated social Catholicism through meetings, journals (*L'Avenir*, *Sillon*, *L'Univers* etc.) and pamphlets.⁵⁶ Some catholic organisations that were designed to raise awareness about the schooling

⁵² Cary, *op.cit.*, p.27.

⁵³ *op.cit.*, p.27.

⁵⁴ Brose, *Christian labor... op.cit.*, pp.235-38.

⁵⁵ Strikwerda, "Review...", *op.cit.*, p.74.

⁵⁶ Irving, *op.cit.*, p.25.

issue and that gathered lower classes were already at place in the rural and urban areas since the 1850s. (*patronages de la societe, des freres...*)⁵⁷ Organisational stage started as de Mun, during his captivation in Germany, established contacts with the German Zentrum party deputies who inspired him of CD institutions. Yet, the sparkling incident was the events of the Commune de Paris in 1871; de Mun became persuaded that not only liberalism did not capture the workers' situation, but also propagated immoralism. Together with René de la Tour du Pin, Félix de Roquefeuil-Cahuzac et Maurice Maignen, he founded the catholic circles of workers to inculcate moral values of social Catholicism.

The catholic circles of workers started out under elite paternalism. It comprised 375 circles, 37 500 workers, and 7600 members from upper classes in 1878.⁵⁸ In the same period, Unions of Workers' Association and Catholic Assembly were set up.⁵⁹ Most working class members were pious but not necessarily militant. Nevertheless, they became convinced that paternalism was not serving their cause; that is, the social question. The general election of 1876 ended paternalism.⁶⁰ These early institutions were more politicised than they were trying to fulfil their TU function. The founders were more preoccupied with spreading the Catholic cause than alleviating social inequalities.

In the 1880s, workers began forming their own organisations especially in the textile sector in the Northern France. In the 1890s, social Catholicism became preoccupied with

⁵⁷ Turmann, M. *Au sortir de l'école: les patronages*. Paris, V. Lecoffre, 1899, pp.48-54.

⁵⁸ "Albert de Mun", *Base de Donnees des deputes francais depuis 1789, Assemblée Nationale, official site,,* http://www.assembleenationale.fr/sycomore/fiche.asp?num_dept=5482

⁵⁹ Turmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 54-56.

⁶⁰ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, pp.169-170.

trade unionism and industrial organisation. Rerum Novarum of 1891 and the Ralliement inspired this initiative. The Catholics set up centres and institutions to educate and organise the workers; i.e. *Union d'Etude des Catholiques Sociaux*, *Semaines sociales*, *Jardins ouvriers*. The idea of corporatism and state intervention gained ground.⁶¹ They contacted each other through a series of congress; these activities resulted in a draft social programme in 1896, and motivated the Catholics for forming a CD party. However, the state oppression undercut the movement, while the rise of positivism and socialist militancy narrowed the basis of support to CD. The lack of papal support and the internal mitigation of the Catholics further debilitated Catholic movements. French Catholics came to conceive the social question as a policy issue in the public sphere and a charity issue in the private sphere. Hence, CD workers' movement was driven by the Catholic cause; but the state-church conflict arrested the development of TUs. TUs organised more activities to spread the Catholic cause than to solve workers' problems.

Despite the presence of craft institutions, it can be argued that the origins of the workers' movement in Belgium go back to the catholic congresses organised in 1863, 1864 and 1867. These congresses gathered workers and businessmen from Liege, Louvain and Ghent. These contacts grew into the Federation of Workers' Movement (*Federation des Oeuvres Ouvrieres*) in 1867. This organisation, antisocialist and elitist by nature, aimed to educate workers against the perils of socialism. The paternalistic tendency within the federation triggered the emergence of a dissident democrat group in 1871. The latter stressed social justice (as opposed to charity), workers' development; and disseminated

⁶¹ Delbreil, J. *Centrisme et Democratie-Chretienne en France*, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1990, pp.14-15.

their opinion through CD press that they established. In response, the Catholic conservatives enhanced their propaganda; but their position progressively degraded as the international structure changed with the Paris Commune, Kulturkampf and the Vatican's unexpected support to the established governments. By the 1880s, democrat tendencies outweighed the Catholics.⁶²

In the late 1870s, inspired by the French model, the federation decided to organise the workers along professional lines. Workers' guilds and clubs followed from this initiative. The first TU movement started in Ghent, in 1878 among textile workers.⁶³ In the 1880s the working class lived its heyday. Non-paternalistic workers associations proliferated in Brussels, Liege and Bruges. The Anti-socialist league in Ghent undertook a wide range of activities from printing, cooperative societies to pension funds, banks.⁶⁴ In Louvain, workers' guild and TUs were founded. The guilds unified under the Belgian Democratic League, which sowed the seeds of today's Christian Workers' Movement. The unions organised a series of strikes; they pressured the Catholic deputies for pay rise, which however, failed in the face of the Liberal-Catholic agreement to keep wages low for international competitiveness.⁶⁵

The systematic efforts to promote a CD TU movement resulted in the establishment of the General Secretariat of the Christian Trade Unions of Belgium in 1904. Later, the

⁶² Gerard, E. & Wynants, *Histoire du Mouvement Ouvrier Chretien en Belgique*. Tome 2, Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1994, pp.19-30.

⁶³ Pauwels, Henri, "The Christian Trade Union Movement, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 247, Belgium in Transition (Sep., 1946), p. 57.

⁶⁴ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, p.188.

⁶⁵ Strikwerda, *A House Divided, op.cit.*, pp.71-79.

National Labour Federation was founded, which in turn transformed into the Federation of the Christian Trade Unions in 1909.⁶⁶ Overall, workers' movement in Belgium expanded over time; its size and influence nevertheless remained inferior to socialist movement. The Catholic-Liberal entente in the Parliament was one obstacle before their expansion. The other problem followed from the localist tradition; the primacy of the local units delimited the scope of movements and associations to the limits of the locality in which they originated. As a result, workers' movement grew unevenly across cities; and the emergence of a unified movement retarded when compared to other countries. The localist tradition in Belgium transformed into pillarisation.

The Netherlands was the only country where Christian workers movements were initiated by the Protestants. Workers' movements emerged in the 1870s; which was delayed when compared to the Germany, France and Belgium. As opposed to Belgium, the state had banned guilds and its likes under the Napoleonic influence. Although socialist TUs had emerged by the 1860s and were organising strikes in Amsterdam, the Christians did not take action before the 1870s. In 1871 the 'General Dutch Workingmen's League' (Algemeene Nederlandsche Werklieden Verbond) (ANWV) was founded by Bernardus Heldt, a furniture maker. The ANWV set to provide welfare and to raise moral standards of the workers. It followed the principle of interclass cooperation through corporatism; and argued for universal suffrage and improved public education. The ANWV was of interdenominational nature; state oppression at the time had compelled the Protestant-Catholic collaboration.

⁶⁶ Pauwels, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

As the control eased by 1876, the Protestants disjoined the union and formed Patrimonium. Patrimonium rejected strikes and state intervention in social and economic matters.⁶⁷ Patrimonium operated under a middle class advisory committee, and did not let lower classes to take the leadership. By the 1890s, the working classes felt the need to emancipate. The first union was founded in 1890; and it drew its first social programme in 1894. In 1888, the Catholic People's Union was set up as a result of the class conflicts within the Church-led Catholic movement. In the same year, Father Ariens established the workers' league for Protestant textile workers in Enschede in 1888; and the Catholic textile workers' trade union in 1890. He then set out to initiate Protestant-Catholic cooperation on the social issue. He succeeded to start a federative structure, Unitas. For long time, Unitas operated as the most effective union; it organised various strikes and addressed workers' daily and professional problems at the local level. It owed its success to the federative structure which allowed the composing units to preserve their identity.⁶⁸ This solution consolidated when the government adopted pillarisation to remedy the minority issue. Overall, workers' movement started later in the Netherlands; Catholic movements delayed even more. State oppression underlay the retard. The movements lingered due to the centre-periphery conflict. The confrontation was overcome after the Protestant majority recognised the Catholic movement as a societal force, and accepted the federative structure as a midway solution to the interdenominational divide.

⁶⁷ van Veen, A. "The Chambers of Labour: Experiments in representation and regulation in the Netherlands in the long nineteenth century", Master's Thesis, Utrecht University, History: Cities, States and Citizenship Faculty of Humanities Research Institute for History and Culture, 2009, pp.48-49.

⁶⁸ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, pp.188-189.

The Italian workers' movement was the one that the Vatican dominated the most. The advent of the movement was also delayed; partly because Italy was a late industrialiser, but also because the Church ardently opposed workers' associations. An additional complexity came from the fact that the Church organisations were stronger in the north, looser in the centre and weaker in the south.⁶⁹ The origins go back to the Congress Movement (*Opera dei Congressi e comitati cattolici*). The latter followed from the Church's attempts to resuscitate the medieval order. It was mainly an umbrella organisation of Italian Catholic Action. Its objective in the 1870s was to revive social solidarity on the basis of charity and fraternity.⁷⁰ In this vein, the movement set up cooperatives societies, savings banks and friendly societies in the 1870s and 1880s.⁷¹ These institutions adopted the mixed strategy and tried to motivate upper classes for congregating in charity organisations. Because the scope of their activities depended on the elite and Church approval, they could not bring substantive improvement to worker's problems.

In the 1890s, the idea that workers could be a separate group gained ground.⁷² Hence in 1894, the first Christian workers' movement emerged as a branch of the Congress Movement. This semi-independent union was not militant, except on antisocialism. In this decade, unions proliferated across the country to counterpoise socialism. Despite institutionalisation, the Italian catholic milieu still held on to the medieval view. French

⁶⁹ Poggi, G. *Catholic Action in Italy; the sociology of a sponsored organization*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967. p.16.

⁷⁰ Agócs, S. *The troubled origins of the Italian Catholic labor movement, 1878-1914*, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988, pp.53-55.

⁷¹ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, p.189.

⁷² Agócs, *op.cit.*, p.57.

activists such as la Tour du Pin and de Mun disseminated ideas such as the necessity to launch modern organisations and to embrace corporatist methods such as wage bargaining, voting on economic policies. Simultaneously, the German Christian activist Kettler argued in favour of organising the working class along professional lines. This agenda provoked reactions; but some groups bought the idea. Romolo Murri was one such modernist priest. Murri started CD movement in Italy.⁷³ The Church's control impaired Italian Christian workers for long time. Their emancipation did not occur before WWII. Accordingly, workers' associations had limited responsiveness to workers' daily and professional problems. The ideological and religious controversy overlay the needs of the target group. Unlike other countries where the main challenge came from the state, in Italy, the Church was the main obstacle.

In all these countries, workers' movements started out under elite control as a reaction to socialism and liberalism; they adopted the mixed strategy. The Church promoted the organic perception of the society following the medieval model of organisation. In so doing, the Church aimed to prevent the masses from mobilising. This view justified elite paternalism. The conviction that the lower classes lacked training and competence to lead their own movements buttressed the legitimacy of this method. This argument however, was not entirely groundless. It took CD social movements a couple of decades of elite training before they could recruit leaders from the lower classes. As a result, at the onset, working classes had little representation within worker's movements. Accordingly, workers' problems and interests lagged behind organisational and ideological issues; TUs

⁷³ *op.cit.*, pp.58-60.

had limited responsiveness to workers' needs. Class conflict initiated the process of emancipation from paternalism. The emergence of working class leaders enabled the breakup. By the 1900s, the proletariat was mobilised enough to demand independence from the Catholic movements. The ideological shift from the educative self-help model to corporatism facilitated the dissociation. Self-governing TUs had greater responsiveness to local demand and problems. The better channel worker interests, the latter set out to influence economic policies through CD parties in parliament. They yet faced two challenges; firstly CD parties were reluctant, secondly, the workers did not sympathise the idea of cooperation with the bourgeois. In the end, the German unionists obtained representation in the Zentrum party; but they alienated the workers. The Dutch and Belgian parties acquiesced to union representation only in return of some favours. In Italy, TUs were incorporated into the CD party.

With regards to the relations with the Church, the intensity of the clash varied as to whether the movement was denominational or inter-denominational. The debate was livelier in Germany and the Netherlands. Domination was easier in the case of the Catholic TUs for organisational reasons and the minority position in the Netherlands and Germany. Interdenominational unions, such as Dutch Unitas, escaped Church domination owing to their Protestant composition. TUs had to wait until the 1920s to gain their independence in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Italy. The Concordat that separated the Church and the state in France helped the TUs assert their

aconfessional nature.⁷⁴ That is to say, effective and influential national organisations emerged only by the 1910s.

Even if workers' movements expanded and some became active in responding workers' needs, the overall performance of the movements lagged behind their socialist equivalents both in terms of size and scope of activities across all countries. CD associations outstripped the socialist movements only among manual workers and clerical workers, and in regions featuring a Catholic minority. Christian TUs were the most influential among the manual workers in Ruhr and Rhineland Westphalia; the Protestant TUs were the most powerful in Bavaria; and Catholic TUs were influential among the manual workers in the Netherlands.⁷⁵ In Belgium, the number of Christian TUs came close to the socialist TUs by the end of WWI. After the war, the intensification of socialist activities across Europe surpassed the CD movement.⁷⁶ In 1940, CD TUs possessed 370,000 members versus 550,000 in the socialist TUs.⁷⁷ In France, CD movement remained the weakest of the five cases. CD TUs were stronger among the textile, mine workers in the North and railway workers in Alsace-Lorraine. In Italy, Catholic TUs also lagged behind the socialist ones almost everywhere. They were relatively more powerful among the manual workers.

It follows that CD workers' movement appealed mostly to the manual workers. They were the most responsive and cohesive in the Netherlands and Belgium; German, Italian and

⁷⁴ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, pp.197-200.

⁷⁵ *op.cit.*, pp.208-209.

⁷⁶ *op.cit.*, p. 209.

⁷⁷ Pauwels, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

French movements followed them in the descending order. Pillarisation underlay the Dutch and Belgian effectiveness and responsiveness to working class problems; i.e. the Belgian Federation (1909), the Dutch Catholic Federation (1908). An additional factor that increased cohesion in the Netherlands was the discrimination towards the Catholics. The federations in these two countries organised along the industrial lines and followed the ecclesiastical method of administration; that is, a hierarchical and vast network that covered local parishes to regional and national groupings. They exercised considerable influence on workers' lives; they encapsulated working class families through affiliated associations for women and the youth; they provided education and social services such as health care, pensions etc.; they took decisions as to which doctor the workers should consult.⁷⁸ The Italian and French movements also adopted federative structures (the Italian federation of TUs (1909), the French Christian Confederation (1919)). However, because they had greater dedication to furthering the Catholic cause than the workers' interests, they channelled their energies to spreading the movement across the country and improving the coordination between TU branches nationwide. Accordingly, their responsiveness to workers' needs remained limited. German TUs had considerable responsiveness to workers' demands at the local level. The pushing factors were the regional concentration of the Catholics and state oppression. In Germany and the Netherlands where the religious question added to the centre-periphery conflict, CD TUs became more successful in addressing workers' needs. CD movements lagged behind in France and Italy, because the controversy over secularisation superposed the social question.

⁷⁸ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, p.197.

In sum, even if all countries featured some dedicated Catholic entrepreneurs who launched CD movements, the state-church conflict arrested the development of the movements in the countries without a Catholic minority. In these cases, the issue of secularisation overrode the social question; the movements had limited responsiveness to workers' demands. Let us see whether the same patterns apply to other social movements.

II. Business & Middle-Class, Professional and Organisations

Like workers' leagues, CD associations for employers and the middle classes in all countries followed from the initiates by some committed catholic activists who acknowledged the necessity to protect the society as a whole from anarchical economic individualism. At the onset, these employers individually undertook actions to improve working conditions at their factories, such as fair wage, reasonable working hours, social services etc. Progressively, they established contacts with other Catholic businessmen in their localities. *Cercles* founded by Philibert Vrau, Camille Vrau, de Segur in northern France exemplify such formations.⁷⁹ Employer activities remained confined to the local level until the WWI.

⁷⁹ Kelly, C. "A Model for Irish Action: Lay Action for Factories and Slums in France", *The Irish Monthly*, Vol. 60, No. 707 (May, 1932), pp. 262-264.

The propagation of corporatism by the end of the 19th century prepared the ground for the shift to more professionalised organisations.⁸⁰ Employers' associations started in the Netherlands. The Protestant employers organised *Stand* movements in 1891 against laissez faire liberalism. The Calvinists established Boaz in 1892. In 1893, Boaz had 2800 members including 343 farmers and market gardeners. In 1918, Boaz divided into three specialised associations.⁸¹ On the Catholic side, the first association came into being in the tobacco and cigar manufacturing sectors. The escalating number of strikes in the 1910s propelled the employers in the metallurgy to set up an association, which the Church and the state welcome.

In 1913, General Catholic Employers' Association (A.K.W.V.) emerged, which in 1915 became the first professed Catholic employers' association of Europe. The A.K.W.V. was originally designed as a nationwide organisation; but regionalist tendencies caused dysfunctions, whereupon, local employers' associations began forming between 1917 and 1922. In 1918, trade organisation started up, firstly among the clay manufacturers, then in the metal industry (the Roman Catholic Union of Employers). The Federation of Employers' Trade Associations, set up in 1919, became the first nationwide association. The Federation operated through two organisations; A.K.W.V. organised educative and cultural activities, K.V.W. was designed to undertake collective bargaining along industrial branches. The employers' associations had good relations with the workers'

⁸⁰ Parker, M. *The labor problem and the social Catholic movement in France; a study in the history of social politics*, New York, The Macmillan company, 1921, pp.392-394.

⁸¹ Paterson, J.L. "The Christian Farmers' Movement in the Netherlands and in Canada", *Agricultural History*, Vol. 75, No. 3 (Summer, 2001), p.311.

organisations in the country.⁸² The Dutch business circles disseminated the idea of an employers association through their contacts with the French and Belgian businessmen; whereby the structure of Dutch organisations served as model in Belgium and France. The middle classes organised through two institutions; the Dutch Catholic middle Class Union, which had the biggest membership in the Netherlands, and the Protestant Christian Middle Class Union.⁸³ CD associations for both the employers and the middle classes were very active in organising and voicing the interests of the strata that they were representing. Trade organisations in particular became very influential in political and economic spheres.

In Belgium, the initiative to form an employer association hit into the clerical resistance at the onset, on the grounds that it contradicted the Catholic principles. In 1923, cigar producers from Antwerp started up the first employers association following the Dutch model. Similar organisations flourished in Flanders around the 1920s among the manufacturers and industrialists and in the Walloon part (the Association of Catholic Employers and Engineers (association des patrons et ingenieurs catholiques) in Brussels, Federation of Chemical and ceramic industries of Belgium, trade chamber of Mons etc.). The Association of Catholic Employers and Engineers officially confined its activities to education and social services. Yet, the members informally took decisions on policy issues, and worked out their interests through personal contacts in policy networks.

⁸² Gremillion, J. *The Catholic movement of employers and managers*, Rome : Gregorian University Press, 1961, pp.11-15.

⁸³ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, p.260.

The Flemish business circles established a nationwide Flemish association (L.A.C.V.W). In line with the Dutch model, L.A.C.V.W organised activities along two channels; one for educational and cultural purposes, the other purely business-related. Later, it abandoned this structure and shifted to the Walloon model of coordination. In 1937, L.A.C.V.W and the Association of Catholic Employers and Engineers merged into the Federation of Catholic Employers, hence forming the first 'nationwide' organisation. Both on the Flemish and Walloon sides, a considerable people held affiliations (in person or contacts) to the academia.⁸⁴ The linguistic divide also continued along the middle classes. The Flemish set up the National Federation of Middle Class Union and the Walloons the National Federation of Middle Classes. The two organisations had around 70000 members; the Walloon part abandoned the denominational label to extend its target group.⁸⁵ Overall, the employers and middle class associations in Belgium became very proactive in addressing the interests they represented. The bicultural social structure limited the strength of the institutions; but within their respective communities, CD associations acquired considerable influence.

In France, the first employers organisation emerged in the textile sector when Leon Harmel founded the Catholic employers of the north of France in the 1870s. The objective was to provide social services and enable consultations with the workers.⁸⁶ In 1884, Harmel and other Catholic aristocrats (who also were monarchists) from the catholic movement established Catholic Association of employers of the north of France. The

⁸⁴ Gremillion, *op.cit.*, pp.16-21.

⁸⁵ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, p.260.

⁸⁶ Gremillion, *op.cit.*, p.21.

court banned this institution in 1892 for its monarchist propaganda. The institution resuscitated under the Social Studies Conference (conferences d'études sociales), while Harmel established the Fraternal Union of Trade and Industry (Union Fraternelle du Commerce et de l'Industrie) in collaboration with the Catholic priest Father Alet from Paris. The Fraternal Union of Trade and Industry showed an effective performance in assisting the Catholics in trade issues as well as in providing personal and religious instruction.⁸⁷ The union reached a considerable size; but it attracted small shopkeepers and employers. The builders dissociated in 1896 to form their own organisation.

The personal initiatives of Father Puppey-Girard gave way to the foundation of the Central Association of Federated Unions (Union federales professionnelles des Catholiques), which became one of the most influential institutions in its category. Founded in 1901, Paris, it comprised 26 trade groups; and assisted its members mostly with regards to legal issues such as insurance, pensions, arbitration etc. The Union collaborated with clerical workers. After the Concordat, because the priests became public officers, their influence on laymen declined, hence their activism. Initiative shifted to activists in the big centres.⁸⁸

In 1926, Joseph Zamanski, the then head of the Fraternal Union of Trade and Industry, set up the first general secretariat, and merged his union with the French confederation of Catholic workers (another entrepreneurial institution) to form the French confederation of professions (confederation francaise des professions; CFP). The latter tripled his members from 1926 to 1935. To mobilise young entrepreneurs, the CFP established the

⁸⁷ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, p. 251.

⁸⁸ Plater, C. (1914) *The Priest and Social Action*, Kessinger Publishing, 2007, p.66.

Young Catholic Business Leaders (Jeunesse Patronale Catholique) in 1929. In the 1930s, the French Catholic employers increased contacts with Dutch and Belgian business circles; these efforts resulted in the creation of an international conference UNIAPAC⁸⁹ in 1931.⁹⁰ With regards to the middle classes, de Mun established the Catholic Association for the French youth (Association catholique de la jeunesse Francaise) in 1886. The association encompassed friendly societies, cooperative societies and social service offices. Semaines sociales also provided a venue to organise middle classes.⁹¹ In 1902, in France, a consumers' league (Ligue Sociale d'acheteurs) were founded. The league addressed people without a salaried job, to whom workers' leagues did not extend; i.e. as women. The objective was to educate people about their consumption behaviour to better protect them in the capitalist economy. By the WWI, the League had 30 sections, and about 4500 dues-paying members, mostly women. This movement spurred the emergence of catholic women's associations.⁹² Overall, Catholic activist elites set up various institutions for the middle classes and the employer along craft lines. The specialisation according to the professional groups helped them obtain some influence; but the religious control by the regime limited their target group.

⁸⁹ "UNIAPAC is a federation of associations, an international meeting place for Christian Business Leaders. Its goal is to promote, in the light of the Christian Social Teachings, a vision and a deployment of Corporate Social Responsibility serving people and the common good of the World. UNIAPAC was born in 1931 as "Conférences Internationales des Associations de Patrons Catholiques", between federations of Dutch, Belgian and French Catholic Employers (and with observers from Italy, Germany and Czechoslovakia), on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the Encyclical "Rerum Novarum" in Rome. After World War II, UNIAPAC enlarged to other European countries and to Latin-American Countries and changed its first name for, in French, ' Union Internationale des Associations Patronales Catholiques', with the initials UNIAPAC (1949)." UNIAPAC, the official website, <http://www.uniapac.org/>

⁹⁰ Gremillion, *op.cit.*, pp.21-24.

⁹¹ Irving, *op.cit.*, pp.39-40.

⁹² Chessel, M.E. "Aux origines de la consommation engagée : la Ligue sociale d'acheteurs (1902-1914)", *Vingtieme Siecle*, 2003/1 (n° 77).

In Germany, no Christian organisations did emerge among the big businessmen until after WWI. Firstly, they did not really have to; the Prussian state followed a high tariff policy in industry and agriculture (the famous iron-rye coalition); it was oppressing labour activity and had introduced social security (pension plans for Christian entrepreneurs who helped their retired or disabled workers and their families). Besides, the state encouraged the foundations of powerful corporatist business organisations whereby it was diffusing the idea of collective good.⁹³ Accordingly, the big businessmen did not feel the urge for taking up collective action. Even if the Catholics felt the need, they would not dare defy the state conspicuously, by launching a denominational organisation that would revivify the centre-periphery conflict after Kulturkampf.

On the other hand, Catholic associations for the middle classes abounded in Germany, especially in Rhineland. Catholic activism started in the 1830s under the Romantic influence of reviving Catholic culture. They undertook collective action at the local level for improving living conditions, such as renovating a Catholic cathedral, repairing railway etc. Industrialisation shifted the focus on to the social question. Middle class Catholics set up denominational societies such as the St. Vincent de Paul Society, the Catholic Journeymen's Association, the St. Charles Borromeo Association, and the St. Joseph Missions Association in the 1850s. The St. Vincent Society gathered doctors, lawyers, factory owners, and merchants. The objective was to enhance solidarity within the Catholic community across classes. The Catholic Journeymen's Association (Kolpingsfamilie), founded by Father Adolph Kolping, was designed to assist the young

⁹³ Habish A. et.al. *Corporate social responsibility across Europe*. Berlin; New York: Springer, 2005, pp.111-112.

and elder artisans (Mastervereine) who lost their jobs in the industrialisation process.⁹⁴ Kolpingsfamilie was the implementation of Kettlers' social Catholicist principles.

The success of Kolpingsfamilie prompted the Austrian and Swiss businessmen to start similar organisations. In 1877, Catholic Commercial Union (K.K.V.) emerged. KKV organised and operated according to the mixed corporation principle. By the end of the 19th century, it had some 40 000 members. Yet, the guild model became less efficient as white collars spread. The latter dissociated from the KKV to form their own TU, which arrested the KKV's development.⁹⁵ In contrast to upper class organisations, middle class organisations were vivid, and very active in remedying local problems. Middle class solidarity had to do with the status gap between them and upper classes; the more the rich Catholics distinguished themselves the more the lower strata enhanced their cohesion.

In Italy, no Catholic employers' associations could emerge before WWII due to the structural constraints. In addition to social Catholicism and cross class cooperation, the Vatican advocated 'non-expedit' till the turn of the century. The Catholic movements therefore, were not allowed to develop links to the state. However, big businessmen depended on the state given capital scarcity. Hence, large employers found themselves in a position to choose between the Church and the state. Further to that, industrialisation had concentrated in the north; where support to the Italian state was stronger than in the

⁹⁴ Yonke, E. "The Problem of the Middle Class in German Catholic History: The Nineteenth-Century Rhineland Revisited", *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 88, No. 2 (Apr., 2002), pp. 263-280.

⁹⁵ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, pp.252-253.

less industrialised south; the industrialist often formed neutral unions, i.e. Turin Industrial League, Italian Confederation of Industry.⁹⁶

A rapprochement took place between the Catholics and the nationalists before the WWI. Seeing the latter's increasing influence on the state, the Catholic moderates struck an electoral alliance with the nationalists against the liberals and socialists. Catholic businessmen welcomed this decision, since they desired the government to maintain high tariffs.⁹⁷ Thus, Catholic businessmen did not form a denominational organisation until the end of WWI. Under fascism, big businessmen and industrialists sided with the state; they received financial support through the banking system, the regime oppressed the labour movements and applied protectionism; and finally the state delimited the church's influence.⁹⁸

Middle classes were incorporated into the umbrella organisations of the Congress movement and the Catholic Action; i.e. the Federation of Catholic men (Federazione Italiana Uomini Cattolici), the Catholic Young Women (Unione Femminile Cattolica Italiana), the university students federation (Movimento Studenti di Azione Cattolica, Federazione Cattolica degli universitari italiani, Movimento di impegno educativo di Azione Cattolica) and cultural societies (Movimento ecclesiale di impegno cultural, Centro

⁹⁶ Riley, D. "Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar Europe: Italy and Spain in Comparative Perspective", *American Sociological Review* 2005; 70; pp. 291-300.

⁹⁷ Cunsolo, R. "Nationalists and Catholics in Giolittian Italy: An Uneasy Collaboration", *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 79, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 22-53.

⁹⁸ Riley, *op.cit.* pp. 298-302.

Sportivo Italiano) etc. Under fascism, the state delimited the Catholic Action activities and incorporated most of its organisations under state organisations.⁹⁹

Professional organisations did not come about in all countries. In the Netherlands, they were the most developed. Catholic associations covered a large array of professions; from teachers of dancing to academics. These institutions had both cultural and educational functions. Their number in total reached some 3000. In Belgium, the Belgian Democratic League had branches specialised along professional lines; i.e. professional unions, professional unions for women, popular leagues, women's cooperatives etc. The membership of these institutions gradually increased from the 1880s to the 1900s, thanks to pillarisation and localism. In that, the movement encapsulated the Catholics through more than one of these institutions; multiple membership and the fact that their family and friend circles also affiliated to the movement reduced the opportunities for defection, especially in the rural areas.¹⁰⁰ Further to that, priests lay down an association for rabbit breeders in West Flanders to improve rabbit trade with London.¹⁰¹ Specialisation helped meet local and sectoral demands.

In France, Father Puppey-Girard's personal initiatives enabled the foundation of the Catholic Engineers' social union. This organisation inspired the journalists, artists to start up a catholic association.¹⁰² In France, the state control (in line with laicism) delimited the size and scope of denominational associations. The other obstacles that undercut the

⁹⁹ Cunsolo, *ibid.* Poggi, *op.cit.* pp.20-23.

¹⁰⁰ Gerard, E. & Wynants, *op.cit.*, pp.49-53.

¹⁰¹ Plater, *op.cit.*, p. 89.

¹⁰² Gremillion, *op.cit.*, pp.21-24.

movement were declining religiosity and rising socialism and nationalism. In Germany, professional organisations date back from the mid 19th century. The early versions were officially neutral but very responsive to local demands and problems, and comprised both Catholic and non- Catholic members. Regime oppression prevented the emergence of professional organisations exclusively for the Catholics until the late 19th century. In 1890, with the alleviation of the state control on unionism, the People's Association for Catholic Germany (Volksverein für das katholische Deutschland) came about. The latter gathered the manufacturers from Rhineland-Westphalia. Its founders were Franz Brandt, a cleric, and Franz Hitze, Ludwig Windthorst and Franz Graf von Ballestrem, parliamentarians. This association succeeded at the regional level; it acquired 729 800 members by 1912 and pursued both cultural and political objectives.¹⁰³ Italy did not have professional organisations for the Catholics, since, as was the case for the middle classes, the Catholic movement organised laymen according to age and gender. Under fascism, most Catholics with a liberal profession or in the public sector (i.e. teachers) had to join fascist organisations.

In all cases, the upper and middle class organisations were initiated by priests. They were the most effective in the Netherlands and Belgium. Their internal cohesion and the absence of the Church-state conflict underlay their influence. In Germany, like in the Netherlands, the centre-periphery conflict facilitated collective action by increasing issue salience and significance for the Catholic community. Regional concentration and industrialisation eased the emergence of confessional associations. In France and Italy,

¹⁰³ “People's Association for Catholic Germany”, *Wikipedia*, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People%27s_Association_for_Catholic_Germany

the state-church conflict hampered the movement, although in different ways. The Church's predominance in Italy and state oppression in France held the movements back. The convergence of outcomes in both cases draws on the dynamics of the rivalry. Thus, the state-church conflict produced a negative impact on the upper and middle class CD movements.

* * *

Catholic movements became more influential among farmers than the upper and middle classes. One reason was that such organisations already existed by the mid 19th century. The other reason was that farmers constituted a larger and more homogeneous community than the upper and middle classes that were divided along sectoral lines. The early versions of farmers associations were cooperatives designed to solve common problems. In Germany, a Protestant cleric and politician, Friedrich William Raiffeisen founded the first rural cooperative in Rhineland-Westphalia in the 1860s. Raiffeisen's unions rested on the self-help principle for the farmers. The Catholic clergy supported his initiative, whereby the Raiffeisen banking system for agriculture established 3100 branches by 1895. Raiffeisen model inspired the establishment of similar organisations in Germany, Italy and the U.S.¹⁰⁴ Following this initiative, Catholic Baron Schorlemer, intellectual and later Zentrum deputy in the parliament, established a farmers' union in Westphalia. His peasant unions expanded were formed in nearly all the districts of West Germany; by the 1870s, their membership had attained 10000. Schorlemer also founded the agricultural schools at Ludinghausen and Herford.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, p. 245. Heric, T. "The Farmer and the Finance", *the Atlantic Monthly*, Boston, Jan. 1913, pp.5-6.

¹⁰⁵ Löffler, K. "Burghard Freiherr von Schorlemer-Alst,," *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. New York: Robert Appleton Company. New Advent, 1912 retrieved from newadvent. <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13588b.htm>

In Italy, Catholic rural cooperatives built upon the German model. The initiative came from Father Cerruti in 1880, Venice, who affiliated to the Catholic Action movement. Hence, his action represented a deliberate effort from the Catholic Action to reach out the farmers.¹⁰⁶ In 1885, Wollemborg founded the rural cooperation, (*cooperazione rurale*) in 1885. He then transformed this institution into a federation of Italian rural credit unions in 1887. Wollemborg did not apply a confessional criterion for membership as opposed to its equivalents. Confessional cooperatives shifted from local self help units to medium size credit union. Their number augmented from 1900 to 1914, such that they constituted 77.2% of the total number of credit unions on the eve of the war. The number of liberal unions shrank, because the confessional ones formed a clientelistic and cohesive network and received support from, first the Catholic Action, then the Congress Movement. On the other hand, liberal unions had strong parliamentarian representation as opposed to the Catholic ones. This comparative advantage facilitated credit intermediation, on which the confessional unions lagged behind. Catholic unions were repressed by the fascist state as the latter saw the Catholic cohesion as a rival.¹⁰⁷

In Belgium too, the initiative to form a cooperative came from a priest, Father Mellaert. His contacts within the St. Vincent de Paul Society led him to set up the Peasants' League in 1886. The League spread all over Belgium, acquiring 560 branches and 20614 members by 1912. The primary objective was to assist them in the economy of

¹⁰⁶ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, p. 245.

¹⁰⁷ Leonardi, A. "Italian credit cooperatives between expansion and retrenchment: (1883-1945)", IEHA 2006, XIV International Economic History Congress Helsinki, Finland, 21 to 25 August 2006 SESSION 72 - Cooperative Enterprises and Cooperative Networks: Successes and Failures, pp.11-48.

agriculture, provide them credits while fulfilling educative and social functions.¹⁰⁸ In 1892, A Raiffeisen type of banks was formed in Brabant. By 1914, these banks existed in big centres Louvain, Liege, Enghien, Bruges, Arlon and Namur.

In the Netherlands, the Catholic Farmers' Union came about in 1896. Right from the beginning the movement reached a considerable level of membership. Catholic collective action propelled the Calvinist farmers to set up a Calvinist union in their provinces. These local initiatives turned into a nationwide organisation, Christian Farmers and Gardeners Union (the Christelijke Boeren en Tuindersbond; CBTB) in 1918, following the adoption of the proportional representation; the Calvinist farmers wanted to ensure representation of their interests. Similar to the employers' organisation, the CBTB organised activities at two levels, sectoral interests on one hand, and cultural and educational activities on the other hand.¹⁰⁹

In France, farmers' movements emerged in 1890; the clergy founded Raiffeisen type of cooperatives, which quickly spread and reached 425 by the turn of the century. Farmers' movement could not expand until the 1930s, due to the 'notorious' image attached to the Catholics as well as to state control on the clergy and the enhancement of laic laws.¹¹⁰ A structural constraint was that French farming community was composed of independent farmers; collective bargaining was not so compelling for this stratum. On the other hand,

¹⁰⁸ Plater, *op.cit.*, pp.80-85.

¹⁰⁹ Paterson, J. "Institutional Organization, Stewardship, and Religious Resistance to Modern Agricultural Trends: The Christian Farmers' Movement in the Netherlands and in Canada", *Agricultural History*, Vol. 75, No. 3, (Summer, 2001), pp. 311-312.

¹¹⁰ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, p. 248.

in the 1930s, strikes in large farming areas increased the issue salience for collective bargaining. As a result, the French Confederation of Catholic Workers decided to set up a branch for farmers in 1937.¹¹¹

Farmers' organisations benefited from the WWI to gain independence and to consolidate their structure, except in France where their emergence delayed. After the WWI, the Belgian and Dutch associations maintained their confessionalism; they represented interests, also fulfilled economic and educative functions. The German and Italian movements abandoned interest representation, and focused on their economic and educational roles with the advent of totalitarian regimes. The latter entirely lost their confessional character after the WWII. In the Netherlands, pluralism and pillarisation explicate the preservation of confessionalism. The Catholic minority was stigmatised; and the Church was militant, which encouraged the Catholic farmers to stick to their denominational difference for internal cohesion. In Belgium, localism and pillarisation conduced to patronage¹¹², while social control made defection more difficult. In effect, Belgian organisations were the most consolidated and centralised.

Hence, Christian farmer movements followed an uneven development across countries. In all cases, the initiative came from priests. They were the most responsive and influential in Belgium and the Netherlands; again as a result of localism in Belgium and the minority position of the Catholics in the Netherlands. The German farmers movement was also quite influential and efficient; it diffused the Raiffeisen model to Europe and the U.S. The

¹¹¹ Wright, G. *Rural revolution in France: the peasantry in the twentieth century*, London: O.U.P., 1964, pp.66-68.

¹¹² Plater, *op.cit.*, pp.80-85.

regime precluded the emergence of farmers' movement in France. In Italy, the movement came out as a branch of the Catholic Action; and expanded thanks to Catholic cohesion. Again, the state-church conflict restrained the scope of action for catholic farmers in France and Italy.

* * *

As opposed to the working class, the reasons for institutionalisation were not obvious for farmers, upper and middle classes. A first obstacle derived from the relatively lower issue salience and significance of the Catholic cause for these groups, compared to working classes which benefit from victimisation by industrialisation. Non-proletarian classes did not clearly see the benefits of forming Christian organisations. The target group often featured traditionalist and paternalistic properties; they were more rigorous churchgoers than the proletariat, and less inclined to fight for revolution. Even if they pursued their interests like other classes, they had the habituation to solve their problems on their own. Individual farmers, such as those in France, best incarnate these traits. Moreover, these groups did not depend on a hierarchical structure such as factory; farmers worked their lands, petty bourgeoisie owned their business, middle class professionals who worked in the public sector had regular income etc. Their relative independence rendered them less vulnerable to the 'disruptive' effects of socialism, when compared to factories which were the socialist strongholds. Hence, these groups had lower risk exposure. Given their relative isolation, these segments found little value in joining CD movements while CD movements found the former less attractive for canalising their energies.

The second obstacle stemmed from economic modernisation. Industrialisation and urbanisation put strains on these groups, especially on farmers; but they were less of a victim of social dislocation than the workers. A third difficulty lay in ideological dispositions. Although farmers and petty bourgeoisie agreed to Christian principles such as cooperation and sacrifice for promoting common good, individual efforts and accounts lay at the core of the Protestant creed. Furthermore, the belief in afterlife turned some Christians away from the ephemera of the worldly life. These beliefs were stronger among the groups living in rural areas, such as farmers and petty bourgeoisie, as they were the remotest from the modern life and urban areas and those who had higher aspirations usually migrated to cities.¹¹³ The problems encountered within the Dutch Protestant CBTB exemplify the point. Although there were economic reasons for mobilisation (Protestant farmers were isolated between the liberal tendency of non interventionism and the socialist inclination to collectivisation) it took about two decades of propaganda to drag people in collective action.¹¹⁴ Finally, some believed in the idea that business was business. This was the case for the Christian Employers' Association (C.W.V) by the 1920s.¹¹⁵ The organisations that undertook both functional and educational activities had greater influence on daily, life than those whose activities confined to cultural contacts and education. On the other hand, the cohesive role of cultural contacts should not be undermined. In the cases of Belgium and Italy (farmers) they tended to patronage. Overall, even if Christian movements among these socioeconomic groups lagged behind workers' movements, they displayed the same patterns; which conduces to the

¹¹³ Strikwerda, *A House Divided...* *op.cit.*, p.274.

¹¹⁴ Fogarty, *op.cit.*, pp. 242-243.

¹¹⁵ *op.cit.*, pp. 239-241.

conclusion that major conflicts of the state building process played a major part in determining how common shocks were filtered. The state-church conflict hampered the development of CD movements in Italy and France across all categories, as the controversy over religion overlay sectoral interests. This finding falls in line with the inferences drawn from the analysis in the first chapter; that is, industrialisation and democratisation do not account for the variations. The cross-sectional disparities stem from the country specific impacts of secularisation.

Conclusion:

This paper examined CD movements in Italy, Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands across workers, the middle and upper classes, professional groups and farmers. The objective was to find out why in some countries CD movements founded more influential institutions which undertook both successful cultural and sectoral activities across all socioeconomic groups. The paper used industrialisation, secularisation and democratisation as the explanatory variables. It referred to Lipset&Rokkan's cleavage theory and to van Kersbergen's anticlericalism and antipaternalism arguments to unravel this puzzle. It was hypothesised that in the countries that underwent the church-state conflict, the dynamics of regime oppression and the constraints by the Church hampered the development and functioning of CD associations. In contrast, in the countries with a Catholic minority, the controversy over religion was externalised onto the minority; hence, secularisation became a national problem. In contrast to Kalyvas' thesis that prioritised strategic interactions and the intended and

unintended consequences of actors' decisions, this paper adopted a structural approach, notwithstanding the role of agency.

The first part of the study examined the structural variables to comprehend the environment in which CD movements emerged and the issues to which they reacted. The paper made a cross-sectional analysis of the impacts of industrialisation, secularisation and democratisation so as to find out whether the variation between the strength of movements across countries stem from some commonality between the domestic impacts of these grand transformations. It was identified that industrialisation contributed to the emergence of CD movements, by skewing income distribution, instigating class conflicts, propelling the rise of socialism and affecting the balance of power between societal actors; and democratisation propelled the rise of the masses. Both variables played fundamental role in the emergence of CD movements; but they did not account for the variation between the strength of CD movements. The variation stemmed from the patterns of the conflict over religion. In the countries with a Catholic minority, the religion issue was framed as a centre-periphery conflict. In the countries without a Catholic minority, the religion issue was framed as a state-church conflict. Another finding of this chapter concerned the Vatican's response to the social question and anticlerical attacks. The analysis conveyed that the Vatican did not issue a full-fledged doctrine. It promoted mixed strategy a strategy of collective action. This tactic helped instruct the lower classes thereby recruit some militant leaders. So doing paved the way to emancipation of movements from the Church and elite control. Emancipation improved responsiveness to local and sectoral demands.

The second chapter made an in-depth analysis of CD movements across socioeconomic groups. It identified that in all cases and across all categories, CD associations followed from the elite and clerical initiatives and operated under paternalism at the onset. They all tried to restore the organic unity within the capitalist society. Press and grassroots organisations diffused ideas. The variations depended on the presence of Catholic minority. Regional concentration of religious minorities increased issue salience and significance of the Christian cause, hence giving greater incentive to laymen for collective action. Industrialisation on the other hand, explains the cross-groups difference in success. Workers being the main victims of the process had greater reasons for mobilising than farmers and liberal professions. Catholic patrons were the main benefitters of industrialisation; therefore they had greater incentive for mobilisation. In all countries, patrons demanded protectionist policies, which urged them to side with (Belgium), and if not, not alienate the state (German and Italian Catholics). The degree of vulnerability to industrialisation affected the propensity of catholic movements to mobilise a group; workers first, followed by upper and middle classes and farmers.

CD movements across all socioeconomic groups shifted moved from following the mixed strategy to specialisation along class and professional lines. Emancipation came earlier among workers and employers' who received the immediate impacts of industrialisation as opposed to farmers, the middle classes and other professional groups. Workers movements, followed by the employers associations were also the most developed and influential ones of all CD organisations. Their greater vulnerability to industrialisation

again accounts for the difference. For others, the stakes of collective action were lower hence were the incentive to join the movements.

CD movements obtained greater influence when denominational differences overlapped with the minority status. That is to say, the presence of a Catholic minority in a country underlies the variations between the influences of movements across countries. In that, in the countries that presented a Catholic minority, the controversy over religion was framed as centre-periphery conflict, because the minority was held responsible for the conflict. Industrialisation intensified the impact of the centre-periphery conflict due to regional concentration. Germany and the Netherlands fall into this category. In contrast, the countries with Catholic majority underwent the controversy over secularisation as a nationwide issue. The state-church conflict intensified state oppression, as well as the Church's constraints on CD associations. As a result, even if they had the basis for expanding their support, or a functioning organisation, oppression arrested the development of CD institutions and the political cause overlay sectoral interests. Accordingly, CD movements became less responsive to local and sectoral demands. In France, the state suppressed CD institutions in line with laicism; whereas in Italy, the Church was an equally significant obstacle to the movements as the state. In Italy, the Church overweighed the state until the advent of fascism. In France, the state overwhelmed the Church, and persecuted organisations with a Catholic connotation. Belgium stands out due to the absence of a minority, hence of the state-church conflict (liberal-catholic alliance) as well as the tradition of localism that stems from biculturalism.

In sum, this paper comes to the conclusion that although the level of influence that CD associations could attain draws on a structural factor; because the same pattern recurred across all socioeconomic groups. The causal mechanism lay in the presence of Catholic minority, which propelled the centre-periphery conflict. The centre-periphery conflict provoked as much oppression as the state-church conflict. What caused the difference was the extent to which the issue gained salience and significance for the oppressed population. Minority situation overlapped with socioeconomic disadvantages and denominational differences. Hence, the centre-periphery conflict increased the chances for CD movements by increasing issue salience and significance in a context characterised by the presence of religious minority. The state-church confrontation produced the opposite impact due to the way the religion was instrumentalised by the two rivals. The primacy of the political conflict limited CD associations' responsiveness to local and sectoral demands; hence, their limited influence. It ensues that although catholic activists took up opportunities, CD organisations became more influential only when the structure was permissive.

APPENDIX I

| | Italy | Germany | France | The Netherlands | Belgium |
|--|--|---|--|--|--|
| Large and medium employers and managers | Organisations with cultural functions | Beginnings of some Protestant organization with cultural and general functions & Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness | Organisations with some influence but limited public support due to regime control on religion | Both Protestant and Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness | Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness |
| Business & middle class | No organisation | No Protestant organization & Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness | Beginning of some organization with cultural and general functions | Both Protestant and Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness | Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness |
| Professionals | Beginnings of some organization with cultural purposes and no substantive professional functions under fascism | Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness | Beginnings of some organization with cultural functions | Catholic and Protestant organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness | Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness |
| Farmers | Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness at the onset but the regime oppression obstructed their development | Organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness | No organization till the 1930s; some organisations with limited influence afterwards due to farmer revolts | Both Protestant and Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness | Catholic organisations with substantial influence and responsiveness |
| Workers | Politicised workers' associations with limited responsiveness to workers' professional problems | Responsive and active Protestant and Catholic TUs; less influential interdenominational TU federations | Politicised workers' associations with limited responsiveness to workers' professional problems | Highly responsive, well-ordered workers' associations | Highly responsive, well-ordered workers' associations |